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Parents Involved, School Assignment
Plans, and the Equal Protection Clause
THE CASE FOR SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
†

Preston C. Green, III, Julie F. Mead, and Joseph O. Oluwole
INTRODUCTION

In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1,1 the Supreme Court examined whether
two race-conscious student assignment plans violated the
Equal Protection Clause.2 In each plan, race was a significant
factor in determining whether children were eligible to attend
oversubscribed schools.3 In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer
argued that a permissive standard of strict scrutiny was
applicable because legal precedent permitted school districts to
use race-conscious approaches.4 Five Justices rejected Justice
Breyer’s argument and held that traditional strict scrutiny was
applicable, in large part because they believed that the Equal
Protection Clause precluded the application of less demanding
strict scrutiny to racial classifications.5 Justice Clarence
Thomas went so far as to say that the Constitution was “colorblind.”6 Likewise, the Justices argued that the racial
classifications could promote feelings of racial inferiority and
increase racial hostility.7 Justice Anthony Kennedy was
concerned that the dissent’s version of strict scrutiny could
expand the acceptance of racial classifications far beyond the
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1
551 U.S. 701 (2007) [hereinafter Parents Involved].
2
Id. at 709-10.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 832 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5
Id. at 746 (plurality opinion); id. at 792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6
Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring).
7
Id. at 746 (plurality opinion); id. at 773 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 795
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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educational context and lead to a nationwide implementation of
race-based governmental measures.8
The majority’s refusal to apply a contextualized
standard of strict scrutiny in Parents Involved needs to be
examined. Notwithstanding the Court’s famous declaration in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District9
that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”10 the
Court has lowered the constitutional standard for public
schools in matters involving free speech,11 search and seizure,12
and due process.13 In these contexts, the Court altered the
applicable constitutional rules because it recognized that school
districts’ fundamental need to operate a safe and orderly
learning environment outweighed its otherwise dogmatic
adherence to strict scrutiny principles. Conversely, the Court
has rejected arguments to adopt special constitutional rules in
the educational context for cases in which school districts’
curriculums threatened to violate the Establishment Clause.14
Ultimately, the Court determined that the text of the
Constitution15 and the Founding Fathers’ specific intent to
protect citizens’ freedom of conscience from the potentially
coercive pressures of governmental religious establishment
mandated a broad application of the Establishment Clause,
particularly in school settings, where students were inherently
susceptible to coercion.16
In this article, we argue that the Court’s collective
jurisprudential analyses of students’ constitutional challenges
to public school actions justify a more nuanced application of
strict scrutiny—an application that accounts for the special
context of public school education when applied to the race8

Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
10
Id. at 506.
11
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408-10 (2007); Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
12
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
836-37 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985).
13
See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 581-83 (1975).
14
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307-09 (2000);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590-92 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963).
15
Lee, 505 U.S. at 591.
16
Id. at 591-92.
9
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conscious student assignment plans at issue in Parents
Involved. Part I of this article provides an overview of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved. It closely
examines the debate between Justice Breyer and the Justices
constituting the majority over whether a less stringent
standard of strict scrutiny should have been applied to raceconscious school assignment plans. Specifically, we discuss
Justice Breyer’s argument that a nonfatal version of strict
scrutiny should apply because the policy was designed to bring
the races together rather than to keep them apart.17 We also
examine the majority’s counterargument that the Equal
Protection Clause is color-blind, and that race-conscious
student assignment plans promote notions of racial inferiority
and increase racial conflict.18
In Part II, this article examines several cases in which
the Court has consistently held that the constitutional rights of
students pursuant to the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments are not necessarily coextensive with the rights of
the general public. Moreover, the Court has consistently
engaged in a balancing test between students’ constitutional
rights and public schools’ ability to function safely, effectively,
and autonomously. In contrast, we find that, in Establishment
Clause cases, the Court has refused to apply a balancing test
based on the language of the Constitution and the statements
of the Founding Fathers. We demonstrate, however, that the
Court still considers the public school context in determining
whether state officials have violated the Establishment Clause.
Part III concludes that the Court’s free speech, search
and seizure, and due process decisions collectively illustrate a
nuanced version of constitutional scrutiny that can be applied
to the race-conscious student assignment plans challenged in
Parents Involved. We show that the Equal Protection Clause is
not like the Establishment Clause because there is no
constitutional basis for concluding that the Equal Protection
Clause is color-blind. We also demonstrate that concerns about
racial hostility do not serve as a legitimate basis for the Court’s
refusal to apply a more nuanced version of strict scrutiny to
race-conscious school assignment plans. Further, we argue that
if the Court had applied the principles gleaned from its free
speech, search and seizure, and due process cases, it would
17
18

See infra Part I.C.2.
See infra Part I.C.3.
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have concluded that a contextualized version of strict scrutiny
was applicable in the Parents Involved case and that the
programs under examination were narrowly tailored to the
compelling governmental interest of facilitating self-selected
public school diversity.
I.

THE PARENTS INVOLVED DECISION

In the Parents Involved decision, the Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of two school districts’ voluntary
student assignment plans, which used race as one of the factors
in making enrollment decisions.19 This section provides an
overview of the assignment plans and a discussion of the
various opinions in the case, paying particular attention to the
Justices’ debate over whether special constitutional rules
should apply to race-based voluntary desegregation plans.
A.

The Facts of Parents Involved

Parents Involved was a consolidation of two cases
involving race-based student assignment policies in Seattle,
Washington, and Jefferson County, Kentucky.20 In the Seattle
case, the school district employed a series of tiebreakers to
determine student assignments to oversubscribed high schools.21
Under the pertinent tiebreaker, the district sought to ensure
that the schools were within 10% of the district’s white/nonwhite
composition, which was 41% white and 59% nonwhite.22 The
district used this tiebreaker to approve transfer requests from
students whose race would serve to integrate the student body
rather than exacerbate any identified racial imbalance.23
A nonprofit corporation of parents and students who had
been denied their school preference asserted that the racial
tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause.24 A federal
district court held that the use of the tiebreaker was
constitutional (Parents Involved I).25 Subsequent to a number of
19

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 710 (2007).
Id.
21
Id. at 711-12.
22
Id. at 712.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 713-14.
25
Id. at 714; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1
(Parents Involved I), 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (subsequent
history omitted).
20
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withdrawals, rehearings, and reversals, and a certified question,
a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the lower court ruling, finding
that the tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored (Parents Involved
VI).26 After an en banc hearing, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
panel on the ground that the tiebreaker served a compelling
interest and was narrowly tailored (Parents Involved VII).27
Specifically, Parents Involved VII concluded that Seattle’s plan
served the compelling state interest of “obtaining the
educational and social benefits of racial diversity in secondary
education,” and “avoiding racially concentrated or isolated
schools resulting from Seattle’s segregated housing pattern.”28
Likewise, the majority of the Ninth Circuit en banc panel held
that the plan was narrowly tailored to that interest because the
school district considered and rejected race-neutral means, and
it only used race as a tiebreaker in limited circumstances.
Moreover, the school district reviewed the plan periodically to
determine whether the racial classification was a continued
necessity.29
Similarly, the Kentucky school district’s assignment
plan was designed to make certain that each non-magnet
school had between 15% and 50% black enrollment.30 The
district’s racial composition was approximately 34% black and
66% white.31 Under the plan, students’ requests for school
preference were approved on the basis of availability and the
racial integration guidelines.32 Students were denied their
enrollment choice if it would place the school out of compliance
with the district’s racial balancing guidelines.33 After students
had been assigned to schools, they could apply to transfer
between non-magnet schools in the district.34 The district could
deny a transfer request based on the racial guidelines.35 The
district had been under a desegregation decree from 1975 to
2000, and a similar plan had been instrumental in helping the
26

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 715; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved VI), 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (subsequent
history omitted).
27
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 715. The Ninth Circuit reheard the case in
Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (subsequent history omitted).
28
Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d at 1179.
29
Id. at 1179-92.
30
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 716.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 716-17.
35
Id. at 717.
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district dismantle the previously segregated system.36 The
district modified the voluntary assignment plan one year after
the district court declared the district unitary and dissolved the
consent decree.37
A parent whose son was denied transfer to a school close
to his house on the basis of the district’s integration guidelines
challenged the student assignment plan on Equal Protection
Clause grounds.38 The district court held that the plan passed
constitutional muster under an application of strict scrutiny.39
The court held that the plan furthered the compelling state
interest of maintaining the integration gained through
desegregation and that the use of race was narrowly tailored to
that end.40 In a per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s decision and adopted its analysis.41
B.

Opinions of the Justices Declaring the Student
Assignment Plans Unconstitutional

On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether Seattle’s and Louisville’s voluntary assignment plans
violated the Equal Protection Clause.42 Chief Justice John
Roberts wrote the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Clarence
Thomas, Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, and Anthony Kennedy,43
that declared the two assignment plans unconstitutional.44
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.45 Justice Kennedy
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but relying on
analysis separate from the plurality of Roberts, Scalia, Alito,
and Thomas.46 This subsection provides a summary of the
opinions that invalidated the student assignment plans in the
Parents Involved case.

36
37
38
39

See id. at 715-16.
See id. at 716.
Id. at 717.
McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 849 (W.D.

Ky. 2004).
40

Id. at 855.
McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam).
42
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 710-11.
43
Id. at 707.
44
See id.
45
Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
46
Id. at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41
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1. Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion: The Court’s Majority
Opinion
In the Court’s majority opinion,47 Chief Justice Roberts
declared that all racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.48 He observed
that the Court had identified two compelling interests: (1) to
remedy the vestiges of intentional discrimination;49 and (2) to
attain the beneficial, educational effects of diversity at the
university level.50 Because the Seattle school district had never
been subject to a court-ordered desegregation decree and had not
segregated its schools by law,51 the school district did not have a
compelling interest to remedy the present effect of past
discrimination.52 Likewise, although Louisville had been subject
to a desegregation decree,53 the dissolution of the decree
precluded the district from claiming a compelling interest in
eliminating the vestiges of past discrimination.54
The Court’s opinion also examined whether the two
school districts could claim that they were acting to achieve the
compelling interest of student body diversity.55 In Grutter v.
Bollinger, the Court held that diversity was a compelling
interest in the context of higher education.56 In Grutter, the
Court deferred to the law school’s judgment that diversity was
vital to its educational mission. The Parents Involved Court
held that the school districts’ enrollment plans were out of
compliance with Grutter.57 While the racial classification
sustained in Grutter was part of a “highly individualized,
holistic review” of applicants,58 race was the determinative
factor in both school assignment plans.59 Additionally, the plans
47

Hereafter, we use the term “Court’s opinion” or “majority opinion” to refer
to those portions of Roberts’s opinion joined by the Court’s majority which included
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Those sections
are: Parts I, II, III-A (id. at 711-25), and III-C (id. at 733-35).
48
See id. at 720.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 722.
51
See id. at 720.
52
See id.
53
Id.
54
See id. at 720-21.
55
See id. at 723.
56
Id. at 722 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)).
57
Id. at 723.
58
Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337).
59
Id. at 723.
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were too limited because they viewed race solely “in
white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/‘other’ terms in
Jefferson County.”60
Further, the Court held that Grutter did not govern the
two assignment plans because that decision was based on
considerations that were applicable only to colleges and
universities.61 As the Court explained, “in light of ‘the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.’”62 Moreover, the Court concluded that
the classifications were not narrowly tailored to meet the
school districts’ diversification objectives.63 Significantly, the
Court found that the plans had a minimal impact on the racial
composition of schools’ student population64 and therefore “cast
doubt” on the necessity and effectiveness of the plans’ racial
classifications.65 Correspondingly, the Court concluded that the
districts failed to give bona fide consideration to “workable
race-neutral alternatives.”66
2. Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion: The Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion67 concluded that the school
districts’ additional reasons for employing the race-based
enrollment plans also violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The school districts asserted two additional compelling
interests: (1) to reduce racial concentration in their schools and
(2) to make sure that racially concentrated school patterns did
not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the best
schools.68 The plurality found that it did not need to resolve the
dispute “whether diversity in schools in fact has a marked
impact on test scores and other intangible . . . socialization
benefits” because the two plans were not narrowly tailored to
achieve the educational and social benefits that would result
60

Id.
Id. at 724-25.
62
Id. at 724 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).
63
Id. at 733-36 (majority opinion).
64
See id. at 734.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 735 (majority opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
67
Hereafter, we refer to those portions of Roberts’s opinion joined only by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito as the “plurality opinion.” Those sections are Part
III-B (id. at 725-33) and Part IV (id. at 735-48).
68
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725 (plurality opinion).
61
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from such diversity.69 The policies were not tied to any
pedagogic concept that might determine the level of diversity
needed to attain the asserted educational benefits of diversity;
rather, the plans were directly linked to the racial
demographics of each school district.70 Neither district provided
evidence to explain why the level of racial diversity needed to
attain the benefits of diversity coincided with the racial
composition of the school districts.71
The plurality also found that the assignment plans were
not narrowly tailored because they had “no logical stopping
point.”72 As the demographics of the districts would shift, so
would the racial guidelines of the plans.73 Furthermore, the
Seattle plan was not narrowly tailored because it was designed
to address the consequences of racial housing patterns.74 This
broad goal violated the Court’s holding in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, which prohibited the use of racial
classifications to remedy general societal discrimination.75
3. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
Justice Thomas’s concurrence rejected Justice Breyer’s
claim, in dissent, that the school districts had two compelling
interests: (1) to prevent resegregation and (2) to eliminate earlier
school segregation.76 Thomas drew a sharp distinction between
segregation and racial imbalance.77 He characterized segregation
in the public school context as “the deliberate operation of a school
system to carry out a government policy to separate pupils in
schools solely on the basis of race.”78 By contrast, Thomas defined
racial imbalance as “the failure of a school district’s individual
schools to match or approximate the demographic makeup of the
student population at large.”79 Although racial imbalance might be
69

Id. at 726.
Id.
71
Id. at 726-27.
72
Id. at 731 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion)))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
73
See id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 731-32.
76
Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77
Id. at 749.
78
Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79
Id.
70
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the result of de jure segregation, it might also be caused by
private decision-making.80 “Because racial imbalance is not
inevitably linked to unconstitutional segregation, it is not
unconstitutional in and of itself.”81 Using this logic, Thomas
concluded that although both Seattle and Louisville might be in
danger of becoming racially imbalanced, neither school district
was in danger of resegregation.82
Thomas also found that the two school districts did not
have a compelling interest in eliminating earlier school
segregation.83 According to Thomas, the Court had authorized
“race-based measures for remedial purposes in two narrowly
defined circumstances”: (1) where a school that had been
segregated by law seeks to remedy its past segregation and (2)
where a governmental agency seeks to remedy past
discrimination that it had caused.84 Thomas concluded that the
two school districts’ plans were not justified under the first
instance.85 Seattle had no prior history of racial segregation.86
Although Louisville had operated a de jure segregated school
system, it was no longer under a desegregation decree;87
therefore, it also had no justification under the second
category.88 Seattle’s justifications were “forward looking—as
opposed to remedial.”89 Counsel for Louisville explicitly declared
that their plan was not devised to eliminate the school district’s
past discrimination.90
Justice Thomas made it clear in his concurrence that it
would be extremely difficult for school districts to establish a
compelling government interest for racial classifications.91 For
instance, Justice Thomas stated that a governmental entity
must establish “a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion
that remedial action was necessary.”92 To establish this “strong
basis,” the entity must provide the following findings: (1) the
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 750.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751.
Id.
See id. at 753-54.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 753-54.
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 756; see also id. at 754-72.
Id. at 754.
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extent of its past discrimination, (2) “the scope of any injury
and the necessary remedy,” and (3) that the remedy is targeted
at “more than inherently unmeasurable claims of past
wrongs.”93 Thomas concluded that neither district provided
sufficient evidence to satisfy that standard.94
4. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality in that he
believed that both Seattle and Louisville had compelling interests
for using race-based student assignment policies.95 He rejected the
plurality’s suggestion that “the Constitution requires school
districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in public
schooling.”96 Justice Kennedy also declared that “diversity,
depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling
educational goal [that] a school district may pursue.”97 He
described diversity in the kindergarten through twelfth grade
context as an interest in “a diverse student body, one aspect of
which is its racial composition.”98
However, despite Justice Kennedy’s belief that a
compelling interest was at stake, he found that neither school
district’s student assignment policy was narrowly tailored.99 He
concluded that Louisville’s school officials did not have a
“thorough understanding of how [its] plan work[ed]”100 because
they described it in “broad and imprecise” terms.101 Justice
Kennedy also agreed with the Court’s opinion that the plans
were not narrowly tailored because they had minimal impact
on the number of student assignments that would be affected
by the policy.102 Consequently, the fact that racial tiebreakers
were employed only infrequently highlighted the likelihood
that the school districts could have achieved their goals
through race-neutral policies.103
93

Id. at 755.
Id.
95
See id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96
Id. at 788.
97
Id. at 783.
98
Id. at 788.
99
Id. at 786.
100
Id. at 784.
101
Id. at 784-85.
102
See id. at 790.
103
Id. Justice Kennedy provided guidance for school districts seeking to use
race-conscious measures to provide equal educational opportunities. He declared:
94
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The Dissent Versus the Majority: Should Student
Assignment Plans Be Subject to Special Constitutional
Rules Under Equal Protection?

The Parents Involved decision is fascinating because of
the Justices’ discussion concerning whether student
assignment plans should be subject to special constitutional
deference pursuant to strict scrutiny or should be subject to a
less exacting level of scrutiny.104 Two dissents were written in
conjunction with the case. Justice John Paul Stevens penned a
short dissent highlighting what he perceived to be
inconsistencies between the Court’s opinion and landmark
precedent set in Brown v. Board of Education.105 Justice
Stephen Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and David Souter, laid out several arguments
for why traditional strict scrutiny should not have been applied
to the student assignment plans.106 The Court’s opinion and the
concurrences by Justices Thomas and Kennedy responded to
these challenges.107 This section analyzes the debate. First, we
examine the arguments advanced by the Justices in dissent
that traditional strict scrutiny should not apply to Louisville’s
and Seattle’s race-based school assignment plans. Next, we
analyze the responses that the three authoring Justices who
constituted the majority made to Justice Breyer’s contentions.

If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of
certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each
student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual
typing by race.
Id. at 788-89.
Justice Kennedy went on to provide examples of general, race-conscious
approaches to achieve racial diversity that would not be subject to strict scrutiny.
These possibilities included “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance
zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion;
and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.” Id. at 789. By
contrast, Justice Kennedy found that individualized classifications would be subject to
strict scrutiny. Id. at 789-90. Although he found that these two plans did not satisfy the
rigors of strict scrutiny, he did hold out the possibility that a program serving a
prospective compelling goal could, at least in theory, survive judicial analysis. Id.
104
See id. at 744 (plurality opinion); id. at 778-79 (Thomas, J., concurring); id.
at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105
See id. at 798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106
See id. at 823-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107
See id. at 735-48 (plurality opinion); id. at 757-82 (Thomas, J., concurring);
id. at 790-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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1. Justice Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens’s short dissent decried the Court’s
opinion as disrespectful of precedent108 and the Chief Justice’s
invocation of Brown in support of that conclusion as a “cruel
irony.”109 He argued that a “rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny
obscures Brown’s clear message”110 and “that a decision to
exclude a member of a minority race is fundamentally different
from a decision to include a member of the minority.”111 He
reasoned that student assignment systems such as the ones at
work in Seattle and Louisville did not “stigmatize or exclude”
and therefore should have been examined differently than the
segregation policies at issue in Brown.112 In particular, he
pointed to the Court’s per curiam decision in School Committee
of Boston v. Board of Education113 that upheld a Massachusetts
court’s opinion that race-conscious efforts adopted by schools in
order to achieve equal educational opportunities did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.114 Stevens closed with a pointed
condemnation of the Court’s holding:
The Court has changed significantly since it decided School Comm.
of Boston in 1968. It was then more faithful to Brown and more
respectful of our precedent than it is today. It is my firm conviction
that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed
with today’s decision.115

2. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
On behalf of the dissenting Justices,116 Justice Breyer
penned a lengthy and detailed dissent. He argued that “[a]
108

Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 798-99.
110
Id. at 800-01.
111
Id. at 799 n.3.
112
Id. at 799-800.
113
389 U.S. 572 (1968) (per curiam).
114
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 801-02, 801 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115
Id. at 803. The import of Justice Stevens’s final statement is that it
expresses his belief that the Rehnquist Court would have reached the opposite
conclusion in Parents Involved. Chief Justice Rehnquist was an Associate Justice on
the Court when Stevens joined it in 1975. See Members of the Supreme Court of the
United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010). If Stevens’s assertion is correct, at least five members of
the Rehnquist Court would have found the plans constitutional (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
116
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Breyer’s dissenting opinion.
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109
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longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that
the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use
race-conscious criteria to achieve positive race-related goals,
even when the Constitution does not compel it.”117 In support of
this assertion, he cited the Court’s statement in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,118 which suggested
that school officials were empowered with broad authority to
mandate that schools’ student bodies proportionately reflect
the racial composition of their districts “in order to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society.”119 While Justice Breyer
acknowledged that this statement was “not a technical holding”
in Swann, he asserted that the Court established a “basic
principle of constitutional law . . . that has found wide
acceptance in the legal culture.”120
Justice Breyer found further support for this assertion
in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann.121 In that case,
the Court claimed that “school authorities have a wide
discretion in formulating school policy, and . . . as a matter of
educational policy school authorities may well conclude that
some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite
apart from any constitutional requirements.”122 Moreover, in
Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Board of Education,123 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated, “While I have the gravest doubts that [a
state supreme court] was required by the United States
Constitution to take the [desegregation] action that it has
taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted
by that Constitution to take such action.”124
Breyer maintained that these various statements were
not limited to situations in which districts were under a court-

117

Id. at 823.
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
119
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
120
Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
121
402 U.S. 43 (1971).
122
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 824 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting North
Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
123
439 U.S. 1380 (1978).
124
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 824 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Bustop,
Inc. v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (opinion in chambers))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
118
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ordered desegregation decree.125 In McDaniel v. Barresi,126 he
noted, the Court upheld a voluntarily adopted student
assignment plan that had no court order.127 Also, in several cases,
the Court ruled that school districts may have to take raceconscious action even when there was no evidence of de jure
segregation.128 Moreover, lower federal and state courts prior to
Swann had held that school districts were not prohibited by the
Constitution from reducing de facto segregation and racial
imbalance in public schools.129 Thus, it followed that “Swann was
not a sharp or unexpected departure from prior rulings; it
reflected a consensus that had already emerged among state and
lower federal courts.”130 Indeed, Breyer continued, “If there were
doubts before Swann was decided, they did not survive this
Court’s decision. Numerous state and federal courts explicitly
relied on Swann’s guidance for decades to follow.”131 Further,
Breyer counted fifty-one federal statutes, one hundred state
statutes, and a number of presidential executive orders that
employed race-conscious measures.132 Moreover, “hundreds of
local school districts have adopted student assignment plans
that use race-conscious criteria.”133
Additionally, Breyer argued that Swann’s statement
regarding voluntary desegregation policies was not surprising,
given that it was supported by the well-established purpose
underlying the Fourteenth Amendment.134 Breyer opined that
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted to eliminate
systematic racial exclusion and to integrate former slaves into
American society.135 Accordingly, the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment understood the fundamental and practical
difference between race-conscious classifications intended to
“keep the races apart” and those intended “to bring the races
together.”136 Breyer also rejected the assertion that recent
125

Id. at 824.
402 U.S. 39 (1971).
127
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 824 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing McDaniel
v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971)).
128
Id. at 825. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 148-49 (1979).
129
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 825-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Tometz v. Bd. of Educ., 237 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ill. 1968).
130
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 827 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131
Id.
132
Id. at 828.
133
Id. at 829.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
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Supreme Court cases—such as Grutter v. Bollinger,137 Johnson
v. California,138 and Adarand Constructors v. Pena139—
superseded Swann.140 While Breyer allowed that “[s]everal of
these cases were significantly more restrictive than Swann in
respect to the degree of leniency the Fourteenth Amendment
grants to programs designed to include people of all races,”141 he
identified two reasons for finding that these cases did not mark
a critical change in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.142
First, in more recent decisions, the Court had made clear that
not all uses of race-conscious criteria must automatically be
treated the same under strict scrutiny analysis.143 Rather, the
Court struck down racial classifications that harmfully
excluded members of other races, but it applied a nonfatal
version of strict scrutiny to racial classifications that sought to
include underrepresented groups.144 Breyer further opined that
the Grutter case, which upheld a law school’s use of a raceconscious admissions program, provided a clear example of the
inclusion/exclusion principle.145
Second, Breyer reasoned that the Grutter case
demonstrated that “[c]ontext matters when reviewing racebased governmental action under the Equal Protection
Clause.”146 Because contexts vary significantly from each other,
the same “fatal in fact” level of strict scrutiny should not be
applied automatically.147 Breyer argued that the more flexible
level of strict scrutiny should be applied to the school districts’

137

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
543 U.S. 499 (2005).
139
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
140
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 831-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141
Id. at 832.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See id. at 832-33.
145
See id. at 833.
146
Id. at 834 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
147
Id. at 833. Breyer went on to note that:
138

Governmental use of race-based criteria can arise in the context of, for
example, census forms, research expenditures for diseases [and] assignments
of police officers patrolling predominantly minority-race neighborhoods . . . .
Given the significant differences among these contexts, it would be surprising
if the law required an identically strict legal test for evaluating the
constitutionality of race-based criteria as to each of them.
Id. at 834.
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policies because they were designed to bring the races together
rather than to keep them apart.148
Applying this more flexible standard, Breyer concluded
that the school districts had a compelling interest in attaining
racial integration.149 This interest contained three elements: (1)
historical and remedial, (2) educational, and (3) democratic.150
The historical and remedial element represented the school
districts’ interests in rectifying the lingering effects of
segregation caused by school policies.151 This remedial element
was rooted in the concern that the American public school
system, in the absence of corrective measures, might undergo
de facto resegregation.152 Likewise, the educational element
represented school districts’ “interest in overcoming the
adverse educational effects produced by and associated with
highly segregated schools.”153 Finally, the democratic element
represented school districts’ “interest in producing an
educational element that reflects the pluralistic society in
which our children will live.”154
The dissenting Justices also concluded that the racebased assignment plans were narrowly tailored.155 One factor
leading to this conclusion was that the race-conscious criteria
merely “set the outer bounds of broad ranges.”156 In other words,
consideration of an applicant’s race was only one minor factor in
the determination of that student’s placement.157 The primary
factor in the assignment plans was student choice, not race.158
The second factor was that the broad-range limitations
were not very burdensome.159 The Justices found that the broadrange limits in the race-based assignment plans ensured that
race only factored into admissions in a fraction of non-merit
based assignments as opposed to large numbers of merit-based
148

Id. at 835. Indeed, Breyer noted that a more lenient application of strict
scrutiny in this case would not imply the abandonment of traditional strict scrutiny. Id.
at 836.
149
See id. at 837.
150
Id. at 838-40.
151
Id. at 838.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 839.
154
Id. at 840 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
16 (1971)).
155
Id. at 846.
156
Id. (emphasis omitted).
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 847.
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assignments as had been the case in Grutter.160 The fact that
rejected students still had opportunities to attend
“substantially equal” schools further substantiated the
dissent’s finding of lessened burden.161
The third factor was that the assignment plans relied
less on race than prior integration plans in the community, such
as mandatory busing.162 Since the race-based assignment plans
were relatively less centered on race than mandatory busing and
other prior integration plans in the school district, the Justices
found the plans constituted a relatively progressive de-emphasis
on race.163 Coextensive with the third factor was the Justices’
view that local school districts have great expertise in matters
affecting education and should have latitude to experiment for
educational excellence, therefore entitling them to judicial
deference.164 The fourth factor concerned lack of reasonable
alternatives.165 The dissenting Justices claimed that narrow
tailoring does not require “proof that there is no hypothetical
other plan that could work as well.”166
3. Responses of Justices Making Up the Majority
a. Court Opinion
The Justices constituting the majority rejected the
dissent’s arguments for applying a less stringent standard of
strict scrutiny to the race-based assignment plans.167 The
majority opinion dismissed as “dicta” Swann’s statement that
school districts could voluntarily use race.168 Furthermore,
Swann was unavailing because the Court in that opinion did
not address whether a district could voluntarily adopt a racebased assignment plan without a prior finding of de jure
segregation.169 The Bustop case was inapposite because it

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id.
Id. at 847-48.
See id.
See id. at 807.
Id. at 848-49.
Id. at 850.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 721 n.10 (majority opinion).
Id. at 721.
See id.
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concerned an emergency injunction,170 which Chief Justice
Roberts characterized as a clear distinction.171
b. Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion rejected the dissent’s arguments
for applying a less stringent standard of strict scrutiny to the
race-based assignment plans.172 The plurality rejected Breyer’s
interpretation of McDaniel, claiming that McDaniel concerned
a school district with past de jure segregation.173 Because
neither Seattle nor Louisville operated—or were acting
pursuant to—a court order to remedy de jure segregation,
McDaniel was inapplicable.174 The plurality also disagreed with
the dissent’s reliance on Swann, labeling the discussion about
school districts’ voluntary use of race to achieve a culturally
diverse student body as “pure dicta.”175 The Chief Justice also
faulted Justice Breyer’s assertion about Swann’s dicta because
it merely advanced racial balancing as a hypothetical
government objective without analyzing whether race-based
classifications would be a constitutionally permissible means
for achieving that objective.176 The plurality claimed the
omission was obvious: Swann “did not involve any voluntary
means adopted by a school district.”177 Thus, even taking Swann
at its full precedential value would not change the plurality’s
holding because the racial classifications proposed in
Louisville’s and Seattle’s school assignment plans were still
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, most of the
lower court cases cited by the dissent as proof of Swann’s
applicability were not pertinent178 because they were all decided
before the Court had definitely determined that all race
classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny.179
The plurality opinion also rejected the dissent’s
assertion that Grutter was controlling and that the “compelling
nature of these interests in the context of primary and
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id.
Id.
Id. at 735-36 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 736-37.
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 739 n.16.
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secondary education follow[ed] here a fortiori.”180 The plurality
emphasized that Grutter focused on the importance of
conducting an individualized, holistic review instead of using
race as a primary factor in determining enrollment decisions.181
Additionally, the dissent’s characterization of the plans as
narrowly tailored was faulty because it failed to consider how
the plans functioned, the students they affected, or the school
“districts’ failure to consider race-neutral alternatives.”182 The
plurality also rejected Justice Breyer’s claim that the Court
should defer to the decisions of local school boards.183 Roberts
countered that such deference “is fundamentally at odds with
our equal protection jurisprudence”184 and that Court precedent
put a significant burden on governmental entities to justify any
use of racial classifications.185 The plurality additionally
rejected the use of racial classifications because such
classifications “promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to
a politics of racial hostility.”186 In pertinent part, the plurality
stated that racial classifications “reinforce the belief, held by
too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be
judged by the color of their skin.”187 Furthermore, racial
classifications “endorse race-based reasoning and the
conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus
contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.”188
Finally, the plurality asserted that the use of race-based
classifications went against the heritage of Brown v. Board of
Education189 and the Fourteenth Amendment.190 Citing the
180

Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 740-41 (plurality opinion).
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 746 (internal quotation marks omitted).
187
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
188
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
189
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
190
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746-47 (plurality opinion). Justice Roberts
made this clear when he asserted:
181

In Brown v. Board of Education . . . we held that segregation deprived black
children of equal educational opportunities regardless of whether school
facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because governmental
classification and separation on grounds of race themselves denoted
inferiority. It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally
separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a
constitutional violation in 1954 . . . . The next Term, we accordingly stated [in
Brown II] that “full compliance” with Brown I required school districts to
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plaintiffs’ brief in Brown, the plurality observed that their
position could not have been clearer: “[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment prevents states from according differential
treatment to American children on the basis of . . . race.”191 The
plurality also pointed out that plaintiffs’ counsel in Brown
consistently argued that admission into public schools was
required to be conducted “on a nondiscriminatory basis.”192
Therefore, the racial classifications challenged in the case in
chief went against the spirit of Brown and the Fourteenth
Amendment by determining admission on a racial basis.193
c. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
Justice Thomas rejected the dissent’s “attempt[] to
marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution.”194 He
intoned, “I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My
view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view in Plessy: ‘Our
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.’”195 Justice Thomas also noted that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys in Brown supported this position.196
Justice Thomas further argued that the dissent’s
attempt to “pin its interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause to current societal practice and expectations, deference
to local officials, likely practical consequences, and reliance on
previous statements from this and other courts”197 was
dangerous because the Court acted analogously in Plessy to
justify discriminatory practices.198 Further, the segregationists

achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955)).
191
Id. at 747.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 772 & n.19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
195
Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
196
Id.
197
Id. at 773.
198
Justice Thomas likewise dismissed any reliance on social science research
in support of the plans. He explained:
In place of the color-blind Constitution, the dissent would permit measures to
keep the races together and proscribe measures to keep the races apart.
Although no such distinction is apparent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the
dissent would constitutionalize today’s faddish social theories that embrace
that distinction. The Constitution is not that malleable. Even if current social
theories favor classroom racial engineering as necessary to “solve the
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in Brown supported the reliance on current practices and
deference to local officials to justify public school segregation.199
Against this historical backdrop, Justice Thomas was unwilling
to defer to the decision making of school officials.200
d. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
Justice Kennedy also objected to the dissent’s call for a
contextualized application of strict scrutiny. He asserted that
the general conclusions relied upon by the dissent “have no
principled limit and would result in the broad acceptance of
governmental racial classifications in areas far afield from
schooling,” likening the dissent’s application of strict scrutiny to
“rational-basis review.”201 Justice Kennedy worried that Congress
could require the adoption of the Louisville or Seattle plans
nationwide pursuant to the Commerce or Spending Clauses.202
Justice Kennedy also rejected the dissent’s reliance on
the Supreme Court’s higher education cases to justify the racial
classifications employed by Seattle and Louisville. The districts
could not rely on Gratz v. Bollinger203 because the admissions
procedures used in that case relied even less on race than the
plans presented to the Court in Parents Involved.204 Gratz was
also distinguished because it arose “in the context of college
admissions where students had other choices and precedent
supported the proposition that First Amendment interests give
universities particular latitude in defining diversity.”205 “Even
so,” Justice Kennedy pointed out, “the race factor [in Gratz] was
found to be invalid.”206 Therefore, it followed that if Gratz were
the appropriate measure, then the Seattle and Louisville plans
would be “a fortiori invalid.”207 Grutter did not control, he argued,
problems at hand,” the Constitution enshrines principles independent of
social theories.
Id. at 780 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
199
Id. at 773.
200
As Justice Thomas asked: “Can we really be sure that the racial theories
that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a relic of the past or that future theories will
be nothing but beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am unwilling to take,
and it is one the Constitution does not allow.” Id. at 781-82.
201
Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
202
Id.
203
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
204
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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because the plan approved in that case “was flexible enough to
take into account ‘all pertinent elements of diversity,’208 and
considered race as only one factor among many.”209
Further, Justice Kennedy found that applying permissive
strict scrutiny would require the Court to set aside two concepts
designed to lessen the injury and negative consequences arising
from racial discrimination: (1) “the difference between de jure
and de facto segregation” and (2) “the presumptive invalidity of
a state’s use of racial classifications to differentiate its treatment
of individuals.”210 In the school desegregation cases, Justice
Kennedy noted that school districts that practiced de jure
segregation had an affirmative duty to eliminate segregation,
while districts affected by de facto segregation had no such
duty.211 Further, “[t]he distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation extended to remedies available to governmental
units in addition to the courts.”212 Justice Kennedy argued that
this distinction served the important role of limiting the harm
that could be caused by racial classifications. Moreover, Justice
Kennedy rejected the argument that school authorities should be
able to resolve the problems caused by de facto segregation
through direct, race-based assignments instead of the general
policies, such as the ones that he proposed; and he explicitly
reiterated his worries about the dangers of racial classification.213
II.

THE SUPREME COURT, PUBLIC SCHOOLS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION

The previous section provided an overview of the
Parents Involved decision. In dissent, Justice Breyer argued
that a more nuanced version of strict scrutiny should have been

208
209
210
211
212
213

Id. at 793 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003)).
Id. at 792 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340).
Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 796-97. Specifically, Justice Kennedy stated:

Governmental classifications that command people to march in different
directions based on racial typologies can cause new divisiveness. The practice
can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our
diverse political heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political
process. On the other hand race-conscious measures that do not rely on
differential treatment based on individual classifications present these
problems to a lesser degree.
Id. at 797.
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applicable. The Justices in the majority rejected this
contention. However, one major omission in the debate over the
appropriateness of special constitutional rules for race-based
assignment plans deserves attention. None of the opinions—
not even Justice Breyer’s dissent—addressed the fact that the
Court, on several occasions, created special rules for other
constitutional challenges to public schools’ actions. In disputes
pitting students’ constitutional concerns against school
districts’ concerns, the Supreme Court has adjusted the
constitutional requirements on matters involving free speech,
search and seizure, and due process.214 On the other hand, the
Court has rejected arguments to adopt special rules favoring
the school district in questions that raise Establishment Clause
concerns.215 Nonetheless, the Court still takes into account the
context of public schooling in deciding whether the
government’s actions violated the Establishment Clause.216 Our
analysis in this section supports the conclusion that the Court
should apply special constitutional rules to loosen its strict
scrutiny analysis with respect to race-conscious school
assignment plans. Furthermore, we will show that this
proposed precedential shift would be consistent with the
Court’s previous application of adjusted standards for
analyzing students’ constitutional rights under the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
A.

Instances in Which the Court Has Created Special
Constitutional Rules for Public Schools
1. First Amendment (Free Speech Clause)

In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the Supreme
Court addressed for the first time the rights of students in the
classroom pursuant to the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause.217 In that case, a school district suspended students who
wore black armbands in protest against the Vietnam War.218
The Court held that the suspensions violated the Free Speech
Clause,219 finding that schools were public places and that
214
215
216
217
218
219

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See id. at 504.
Id. at 514.
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students had the right to express their opinions within the
confines of those institutions.220 The Court famously declared,
“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.”221 Still, the Court cautioned, this right
must be balanced against the legitimate interests of school
officials in the safe and orderly operation of schools.222 With
respect to the armband protest, the Court observed that there
was no evidence of “interference, actual or nascent, with the
schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to
be secure and to be let alone.”223 The Court held that this
conduct was protected by the Free Speech Clause and
distinguished it from student speech that “materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.”224
Since the landmark Tinker decision, the Supreme Court
on three occasions has found that the First Amendment rights
of students pursuant to the Free Speech Clause are limited by
their school districts’ legitimate interests in operating safe and
orderly schools. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the
Court held that school districts could discipline students for
lewd and indecent speech.225 The Court acknowledged that
although “[t]he First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in
matters of adult public discourse,”226 it did not follow that “the
same latitude must be permitted to children in a public
school.”227 The Court based the authority of school districts to
prohibit vulgar speech on their in loco parentis power228 to
“inculcate the habits and manners of civility.”229 The Court
reasoned it was necessary for schools to teach these values
220

See id. at 506.
Id.
222
Justice Fortas, the opinion’s author, explained: “[T]he Court has repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools.” Id. at 507.
223
Id. at 508.
224
Id. at 513. This essentially expresses the Tinker substantial disruption test
which authorizes schools to regulate student speech that would substantially and
materially disrupt the school or the rights of other students.
225
478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
226
Id. at 682.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 684. In loco parentis is a Latin phrase meaning “in the place of a
parent” or “instead of a parent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009).
229
Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
221
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because they were “necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system.”230 It was legitimate for schools to
decide that “the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct
cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or
offensive speech and conduct.”231
In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,232 the Court further described
the limitations of student expression. The Court ruled that a
high school principal could remove an article from the school’s
newspaper that discussed student experiences with pregnancy233
and another article that discussed students’ experiences with
divorce.234 While recognizing Tinker’s admonition that public
school students “do not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”235 the
Court pointed out that students’ First Amendment rights were
not “automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings”236 and “must be applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.”237 The Justices
distinguished the instant case from Tinker.238 While Tinker dealt
with “educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression
that happens to occur on the school premises,” Hazelwood
“concern[ed] educators’ authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school.”239 The Court characterized the latter set of activities “as
part of the school curriculum . . . so long as they are supervised
by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.”240
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over [curricularrelated] expression to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are
not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
230

Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 67, 76-77 (1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
231
Id. at 683.
232
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
233
Id. at 274, 276.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 280 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236
Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682) (internal quotation marks omitted).
237
Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506) (internal quotation marks omitted).
238
Id. at 270.
239
Id. at 271.
240
Id.
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maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school.241

This authority enabled a school to “‘disassociate itself’
. . . from speech that is ungrammatical, poorly written,
inadequately researched, biased, or prejudiced, vulgar or
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.”242 Additionally,
a school could consider the emotional maturity of the intended
audience before disseminating student speech on potentially
controversial subjects.243 Schools further retained the authority
to refuse sponsoring speech that was inconsistent with the
“shared values of a civilized order.”244 Otherwise, citing Brown,
the Court observed, “the schools would be unduly constrained
from fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him adjust normally
to his environment.’”245
Consequently, the Court concluded that the standard
established in Tinker for punishing student expression did not
apply for determining when a school may disseminate student
expression.246 Instead, the Court ruled that schools did not
violate the First Amendment in exercising their control over
the content of student expression in school-sponsored activities
“so long as their actions [we]re reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”247 This standard was in keeping with the
Court’s frequently expressed belief that education was
“primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and
local officials, and not of federal judges.”248
Most recently, the Court’s ruling in Morse v. Frederick249
further emphasized school officials’ legitimate authority over
student speech when that speech appeared to promote drug
use. The Court found that the “special characteristics of the
school setting” enabled a school district to suspend a student
who hoisted a banner supporting drug use at an off-campus,

241
242
243
244

Id.
Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
Id. at 272.
Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 683) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
245
246
247
248
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Id. (quoting Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 273.
Id.
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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school-sponsored event.250 At this event, this student—along
with several others—unfurled a banner that read “BONG HiTS
4 JESUS,” which the principal believed promoted drug use.251
After the student refused to take down the banner, the
principal confiscated it and later suspended the student.252
The student sued, claiming that the suspension violated
his First Amendment rights.253 The Court disagreed, holding that
school districts could restrict student speech at school events
“when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use.”254 In reaching this conclusion, the Court took special note of
two basic principles taken from the Fraser case.255 The first point
was that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”256 While Morse’s speech, like Fraser’s, would have been
protected if it had occurred outside of the school setting, this
speech could be limited “in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment.”257 The second principle was that Tinker’s
substantial disruption test was not absolute.258
Further, the Court observed that it had recognized in
the Fourth Amendment context that deterring student drug
use “is an important—indeed, perhaps compelling interest.”259
The Court found further support for the importance of
educating students about the dangers of drug use because
Congress had provided billions of dollars to support drug
prevention programs at the state and local level.260 Congress
had also required schools receiving federal funding under the
Safe and Drug-Free Schools Community Act of 1994 to confirm
that their drug prevention programs “convey[ed] a clear and
consistent message that . . . the illegal use of drugs is wrong

250

Id. at 393, 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
251
Id. at 397-98.
252
Id. at 398.
253
Id. at 399.
254
Id. at 403.
255
Id. at 404-05.
256
Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
257
Id. at 405 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
258
Id.
259
Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260
Id. at 408.
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and harmful.”261 Moreover, the Court noted that “[t]housands of
school boards throughout the country . . . have adopted policies
aimed at effectuating this message.”262
The Court concluded that the “special characteristics of
the school environment . . . and the governmental interest in
stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict
student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting
illegal drug use.”263 The Court distinguished the relaxed
standard in Morse from Tinker’s material disruption standard
because it found that a school district’s interest in combating
student drug use was a more compelling interest than a school
district’s “abstract desire to avoid controversy.”264
2. Fourth Amendment
Another constitutional provision that has raised conflict
between school districts and students is the Fourth Amendment,
which prohibits unreasonable search and seizure by government
agents.265 Generally, police must have probable cause and a
warrant before conducting a search.266 Before the Supreme Court
resolved the issue, there had been a debate among the courts as
to whether the Fourth Amendment applied to searches
conducted by public school officials,267 and, if so, the appropriate
constitutional standard for conducting a search.268
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court concluded
that, while the Fourth Amendment applied to searches
conducted by public school officials, a special standard was
necessary to recognize the particular interests of the school
environment. In determining the level of protection that should
be accorded to searches conducted by public school officials, the
Court struck a balance between the student and school
261

Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. IV)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 408-09.
265
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
266
See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
267
The Court resolved this debate in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985). It reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fourth Amendment
applicable to the states, and, therefore, unreasonable searches and seizures by state
officers are prohibited. Id. at 334. The Board of Education is a part of the State, and as
such is bound by the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures. Id. at 334 & n.4.
268
This issue was also resolved in New Jersey v. T.L.O. See id. at 338-43.
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concerns.269 Students had a legitimate expectation of privacy,
which included the right to “carry with them a variety of
legitimate, non-contraband items, and there was no reason to
conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy
in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.”270
Comparatively, public schools had a substantial interest in
maintaining order and a proper educational environment.271
The Court observed that “maintaining security and order in the
schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school
disciplinary procedures.”272 Ultimately, the Court concluded
that the warrant requirement was particularly unsuited to the
school environment because it “would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the schools.”273 The Court also found that the
“accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with
the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom to maintain order in the schools [did] not require strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on
probable cause.”274
The Court held that reasonableness was the correct
standard for determining the constitutionality of a search of a
student in the public school setting.275 Determining
reasonableness required a two-step inquiry.276 The first question
asks whether the search “was justified at its inception.”277 The
second question considers whether the search, as conducted,
“was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.”278 The Court
asserted that the reasonableness standard would sufficiently
balance the concerns of students and school authorities.
Teachers and administrators would be spared “the necessity of
schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and
permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates
of reason and common sense.”279 The reasonableness standard
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279

See id. at 337.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
Id.
Id. at 343.
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also protected students by ensuring that their interests would
be invaded only to the extent necessary to effectuate “the
legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.”280
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,281 the Court
expanded school officials’ authority with respect to student
searches. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment
permitted random urinalysis as a requirement for all students
who wished to participate in interscholastic athletics.282 In
Vernonia, the school district implemented a random urinalysis
requirement for participation in sports because evidence
showed that athletes were the leaders of a student drug culture
in the district, and school officials were worried that drug use
increased the risk of sports-related injury.283
The Court held that, while the district’s drug testing
policy constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, the
district was not required to obtain a warrant or establish
probable cause, as was the case in searches by law enforcement
officials.284 Government officials could conduct a search
unsupported by probable cause and without a warrant “when
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.”285 The Court then noted that it had recognized
the existence of special needs in the public school context that
did not require school officials to obtain a warrant or establish
probable cause.286 Quoting T.L.O., the Court observed that “the
warrant requirement ‘would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
[that are] needed,’ and ‘strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause’ would undercut ‘the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
maintain order in the schools.’”287 While T.L.O. was
distinguishable because the search approved in that case “was
based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,” the Court
found that individualized suspicion was not required because

280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

Id.
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Id. at 650, 665.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 653, 665.
Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
Id.
Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)).
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“the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
such suspicion.”288
In addition to the Court’s anti-drug finding, one of the
factors it considered was the nature of the students’ privacy
interests.289 With respect to students’ privacy interests, the
Court explained that “Fourth Amendment rights, no less than
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public
schools than elsewhere: the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot
disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for
children.”290 Public schools required students to undergo a
variety of physical examinations and vaccinations “[f]or their
own good and that of their classmates.”291 Therefore, with
regard to medical examinations and procedures, students in
the public school environment had a lesser privacy expectation
than the general public.292
Student athletes had an even lesser expectation of
privacy because they “voluntarily subject[ed] themselves to a
degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students
generally.”293 These regulations required student athletes to
undergo a preseason physical exam, provide a urine sample,
acquire adequate insurance coverage, and maintain a
minimum grade point average.294
In Board of Education of Independent School District
No. 92 v. Earls,295 the Court once more upheld an expansion of
school authority. The Earls Court held that a school district
could require students who participate in competitive
extracurricular activities other than sports to submit to
random urinalysis.296 In Earls, the Court rejected the assertion
that evidence of pervasive drug use was necessary before the
district could implement a suspicionless drug testing policy.297
“Given the nationwide epidemic of drug use, and the evidence
of increased drug use in Tecumseh schools, it was entirely
reasonable for the School District to enact this particular drug

288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297

Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id. at 656-57.
Id.
Id. These were the Vernonia School District athletic regulations. Id.
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
Id. at 828, 830.
Id. at 836.
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testing policy.”298 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
repeatedly emphasized that the “only consequence of a failed
drug test is to limit the student’s privilege of participating in
extracurricular activities.”299
The Court’s most recent pronouncement in the area of
students’ Fourth Amendment rights resolved a disputed strip
search of a thirteen-year-old girl by public school officials in
Safford Unified School District v. Redding.300 In its analysis, the
Court reaffirmed the need to balance a student’s rights with a
school district’s need to maintain order and ensure the safety of
the entire student body.301 The Court then applied the T.L.O.
test and held that, while school authorities had reasonable
suspicion that the pupil had contraband—prescription strength
ibuprofen and over-the-counter naproxem302—the ensuing
search was not reasonable in scope and therefore violated her
rights.303 Justice Souter directly addressed the limitation to
deference to school decision-making when intrusive student
searches are at issue:
In so holding, we mean to cast no ill reflection on the assistant
principal, for the record raises no doubt that his motive throughout
was to eliminate drugs from his school and protect students . . . [T]he
Fourth Amendment places limits on the official, even with the high
degree of deference that courts must pay to the educator’s
professional judgment.
We do mean, though, to make it clear that the T.L.O. concern to
limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of
reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding
evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the
quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of
intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation
its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a
category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.304

Thus, the Court made clear that, although the ruling
preserved the special T.L.O. test, the deference afforded school

298
299
300
301
302
303
304

Id.
Id. at 833.
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
Id. at 2639.
Id. at 2642.
Id. at 2642-43.
Id. at 2643.
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officials through its application and, given the special concerns
of public schools, was not unfettered or without limitation.305
3. Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause)
The third area in which the Court has applied special
rules for kindergarten through twelfth grade settings is with
respect to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Goss v. Lopez,306 the Court determined the
procedural due process rights of persons suspended for ten
days or fewer.307 The Court found that students who were
suspended for up to ten days were entitled to due process
because they had a legitimate property interest in a public
education based on state law.308 In determining the level of due
process to be accorded to these students, the Court observed
that, “[a]t a very minimum . . . , students facing suspension and
the consequent interference with a protected property interest
must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of
hearing.”309 The Court noted, however, that the student’s right
to explain his version of the events was to be balanced against
the school district’s need to maintain order and discipline.310
The Court also noted that “the timing and content of the
notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate
accommodation of the competing interests involved.”311 The
student was concerned about “avoid[ing] unfair or mistaken
exclusion from the educational process, with all of its
unfortunate consequences.”312 Schools, on the other hand,
needed to maintain “[s]ome modicum of discipline and order . . .
if the educational function is to be performed” and relied on
suspensions as a teaching tool.313
Balancing the concerns of students and the school, the
Court rejected the notion “that school authorities must be
totally free from notice and hearing requirements if their
305

The Court also determined that since the limitation on strip searches was
not clearly established at the time Ms. Redding came under suspicion, the principal
was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. Id. at 2644.
306
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
307
Id. at 567.
308
Id. at 576.
309
Id. at 579.
310
Id. at 580.
311
Id. at 579.
312
Id.
313
Id. at 580.
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schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency.”314 A student
facing suspension of ten days or fewer had a right to “be given
oral and written notice of the charges against him and, if he
denie[d] them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”315 The
Due Process Clause “requires at least these rudimentary
precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct
and arbitrary exclusion from school.”316 Still, the Court refused
to require that hearings connected with short suspensions
provide students with the opportunity to obtain counsel, to
cross-examine witnesses, or to call supporting witnesses
because of the special nature of the educational enterprise.317
Two years later, in Ingraham v. Wright, the Court
considered the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause to the imposition of corporal punishment in
schools.318 The Court held “that corporal punishment in public
schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
but . . . that the traditional common-law remedies are fully
adequate to afford due process.”319 Once again, the special
nature of schools weighed heavily in the Court’s analysis. First,
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, explained that,
because liberty interests had always encompassed “freedom
from bodily restraint and punishment,” the state was required
to comply with due process.320 Accordingly, the case turned on
“what process is due.”321 To resolve this question, the Court
noted that the traditional role of corporal punishment in school
contexts “is to correct a child’s behavior without interrupting
314
315
316
317

Id. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 583. Specifically, the Court explained:

To impose in each such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well
overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources,
cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further
formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary
nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also
destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.
Id.
318

430 U.S. 651 (1977). Ingraham v. Wright also investigated whether
corporal punishment implicated the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and
unusual punishment. In a 5-4 opinion, the Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to corporal punishment in schools. Id. at 671.
319
Id. at 672.
320
Id. at 673-74 (footnote and internal citation omitted).
321
Id. at 674.
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his education.”322 As with First and Fourth Amendment rights,
the Court examined the competing interests at stake and
recognized that children faced some risk when disciplinarians
resorted to corporal punishment.323 Even so, the Court was
unwilling to impose notice and hearing requirements in
advance of any corporal punishment, reasoning that any
procedures that would protect students against wrongful
punishment would not outweigh the “costs” they would impose
on the orderly operation of schools.324 For instance, teachers
may decide to resort to less effective disciplinary strategies
instead of corporal punishment because of “the possible
disruption that prior notice and a hearing may entail.”325
Ultimately, the Court held that the Due Process Clause does
not require public schools to provide notice and a hearing
before imposing corporal punishment. This holding
demonstrated the Court’s belief that the school district’s
interest in maintaining effective and flexible disciplinary
control over its students outweighed the need to strictly enforce
students’ due process rights.326
B.

Denial of Special Constitutional Tests: The
Establishment Clause

As noted above, the Supreme Court has created special
constitutional rules recognizing that students’ rights are not
“coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”327 By
contrast, the Court has consistently refused to develop special
constitutional rules in Establishment Clause challenges where
students are compelled or coerced to adopt a particular
religious viewpoint. In each of these cases, the Court noted that
the Founding Fathers were especially concerned that statesponsored religious exercises posed a serious danger to freedom
of conscience.328 Therefore, the Court was unwilling to accept
322

Id. at 674 n.43.
Id. at 676.
324
Id. at 680.
325
Id. at 680-81.
326
Id. at 682.
327
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). See generally
supra Part II.A.
328
The Court has heard numerous cases on the Establishment Clause in
relation to public elementary and secondary education. Those cases fall roughly into
three categories: (1) cases involving public funding relating to religion (see, e.g., Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding the constitutionality of publicly
funded voucher program including sectarian schools); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
323
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the arguments raised by the public schools that would have
permitted the religious activity if the facts led to the conclusion
that state action “established” religion.
In School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v.
Schempp,329 the Court held that the state practice of requiring
schools to begin each day with a Bible reading violated the
Establishment Clause. In reaching this decision, the Court
discussed the relationship between the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause
prohibits “a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a
concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that
official support of the State or Federal Government would be
placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.”330 The
Court explained that to withstand an Establishment Clause
challenge, legislation must have a secular purpose and must
neither advance nor inhibit religion.331
Comparatively, the Free Exercise Clause “recognizes the
value of religious training, teaching and observance and, more
particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own
course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the
state.”332 The purpose of the Free Exercise Clause “is to secure
religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority.”333 To establish a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
enactment has a coercive effect on his ability to practice his
religion.334 Thus, the Court concluded that the difference
between the two clauses is that the Free Exercise Clause

Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating direct funding to private
religious schools)); (2) cases which deal with prayer (see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990) (allowing a student-led religious group at a public high school);
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating the practice
of daily prayers over the school’s intercom)); and (3) cases which deal with religion in
the curriculum (see, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating a
state statute requiring the teaching of Creationism whenever evolution was taught);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (invalidating
religious instruction delivered on public school grounds)). The universe of cases is too
numerous to include a summary of each here. Rather, we focus on the prayer cases and
have selected those cases that discuss the tension between the Establishment Clause
and other First Amendment rights, whether speech or exercise of religion. We also
focus on those cases most recently decided by the Court.
329
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
330
Id. at 222.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 223.
334
Id.
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requires a showing of coercion, while the Establishment Clause
does not.335
Applying these principles, the Court found that the
practice of Bible reading violated the Establishment Clause.336
The fact that students could absent themselves upon parental
request was no defense to the finding of unconstitutionality.
Further, the Court held that it was no defense that the
religious practices were “minor encroachments on the First
Amendment.”337 In reaching this decision, the Court cited
Memorial & Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,338
written by James Madison, the principal architect of the Bill of
Rights.339 Writing for the Court, Justice Clark warned that
“[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may
all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of
Madison, ‘it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on
our liberties.’”340 In addition, the Court rejected the argument
that the refusal to permit Bible reading in the public schools
violated the free exercise rights of the majority. “While the
Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to
deny the rights of free exercise to anyone,” the Court explained,
“it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of
the State to practice its beliefs.”341
The Supreme Court provided further instruction on the
relationship between the Religion Clauses in Board of
Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.342
Mergens involved a high school student who wished to create a
student-led religious group. School officials denied the request
on the rationale that to do otherwise would create a symbolic
link between the school and religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause.343 To consider this contention, the Court
335

Id.
Id.
337
Id. at 225.
338
Id. at 213.
339
See JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 1772-1836 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Library of
America 1999).
340
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (quoting MADISON, supra note 339).
341
Id. at 226 (emphasis omitted).
342
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
343
Id. at 231. The plaintiffs alleged that school officials must allow formation
of their group in order to comply with the federal Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 40714074 (2006). The Equal Access Act prohibits public secondary schools that have created
“a limited open forum” to limit student groups “on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.” Id. § 4071(a). The
school claimed that it only allowed clubs related to the curriculum and, therefore, had
336
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applied an endorsement analysis, which requires examination
of whether a reasonable observer would perceive a
governmental endorsement of religion.344 If so, then the activity
is impermissible under the Establishment Clause, even if it
results in curtailment of students’ right to exercise religion or
express themselves from a religious viewpoint.345 Given the
broad array of student clubs available at the high school in
question, the Court concluded that a reasonable observer would
comprehend that school officials were merely accommodating
the myriad interests of its students, not endorsing the activity
in question.346 What is telling about this analysis is the Court’s
tacit acceptance of the absolute prohibition formed by the
Establishment Clause. Had the endorsement test confirmed
school officials’ concerns about a violation, the denial of the
students’ request would have been proper.347
The Court next addressed the obligation of public
schools to adhere to the Establishment Clause in Lee v.
Weisman,348 where the majority ruled that the practice of
including nonsectarian prayer in public school graduations
violated the Establishment Clause because it coerced those in
attendance to act in a religious manner.349 In Lee and in keeping
with tradition for that school, the principal decided to include
an invocation and a benediction in the ceremony. The principal
chose the religious participant—a rabbi—and also provided the
rabbi a pamphlet with guidelines as to how to conduct a
nonsectarian prayer.350 The school argued that the justification
for the nonsectarian prayer was to advance tolerance and help
students learn to live a pluralistic society.351
In reaching the conclusion that the practice violated the
First Amendment, the Court made a subtle shift from Schempp
in discussing the relationship between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy
not created the requisite “limited open forum.” The Court rejected this contention,
pointing to the scuba club and chess club as examples of non-curriculum-related clubs.
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 244-46. As such, the Court held that the Equal Access Act applied
and then turned to examine whether the Establishment Clause nonetheless required a
denial of the request to form the club. Id. at 247.
344
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-50.
345
Id. at 250.
346
Id.
347
See id.
348
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
349
Id. at 599.
350
Id. at 581.
351
Id. at 590.
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explained, “The principle that government may accommodate
the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise.”352 Thus, the Court recognized that the
government could violate the Establishment Clause by coercing
citizens to act in a religious manner.
The Court found that the school’s involvement in the
development of the school prayers violated this principle. The
school’s extensive involvement in the selection of the rabbi could
create divisiveness because “subtle coercive pressures exist . . .
where the student had no real alternative which would have
allowed her to avoid the fact or appearance of participation.”353
The school countered that its directions for the content of the
prayers were “a good-faith attempt by the school to ensure that
the sectarianism which is so often the flashpoint for religious
animosity be removed from the graduation ceremony.”354 While
the school’s concern was understandable, Justice Kennedy
observed that its good faith was not the issue. Instead, the
pertinent question was whether the school could legitimately
invite someone to produce a prayer for a formal religious
exercise, which all students would be required to attend.355
The Court found that the school’s actions were indeed
illegitimate. Justice Kennedy explained that the Religion
Clauses were not merely designed to protect the rights of
minorities; they also existed “to protect religion from
government interference.”356 These concerns led Justice Kennedy
to conclude that the school officials’ creation of a nonsectarian
prayer violated the Establishment Clause because the
involvement of school officials “will be perceived by the students
as inducing a participation they might otherwise reject.”357
Justice Kennedy also rejected the school’s claim that the
practice of nonsectarian prayer during graduation was
justifiable as a bulwark against intolerance because it
overlooked a fundamental difference between freedom of

352
353
354
355
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Id. at 587.
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Id. at 589.
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worship and freedom of speech.358 While “[t]he Free Exercise
Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has
close parallels in the speech provisions of the First
Amendment,” Justice Kennedy explained, “the Establishment
Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in
religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech
provisions.”359 The reason for this difference rested in the fear of
the Founding Fathers that “what might begin as a tolerant
expression of religious views may end in a policy to
indoctrinate and coerce.”360
The Court’s decision in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe361 solidified the precedent established in Lee.
Santa Fe once again involved religious expression, though this
time led by students prior to high school football games.362 The
school district had a long history of sponsoring prayers before
sporting events, which even included an elected student
“chaplain” to deliver the prayers.363 Although that policy had
been replaced, the prayers before football games continued.364
The district argued that they had created a “limited open
forum” for the purpose of student expression before each
game.365 Therefore, officials claimed the speech was “private”
and not governmental speech, placing it outside the ambit of
the Establishment Clause.366 The Court rejected this thinking.
That the prayers were student-led was insufficient to
transform the practice from governmental speech into private
speech.367 Justice Stevens, writing for a six-Justice majority,368
again employed an endorsement analysis, concluding that the
358
359
360

Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 592. Justice Kennedy concluded with the reminder that

The lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in the modern world as in
the 18th century when it was written. One timeless lesson is that if citizens
are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its
own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief
which is the mark of a free people.
Id.
361

530 U.S. 290 (2000).
Id. at 294.
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Id. at 302.
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See id. at 302-05.
368
Id. at 292. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id.
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public would “perceive the pregame message as a public
expression of the views of the majority of the student body
delivered with the approval of the school administration.”369
Moreover, the Court noted that any analysis of endorsement
must take into consideration the history and context of the
policy and practice under scrutiny.370 In this instance, the Court
concluded that the revised policy was written in order “to
preserve the practice of prayer before football games.”371 While
the Court’s ruling did not prohibit private religious activity, it
cautioned that “the religious liberty protected by the
Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors
the particular religious practice of prayer.”372
This balance between private voluntary prayer and
state-orchestrated prayer was again at issue in Good News
Club v. Milford Central School.373 This case challenged a school
district’s denial of a request to use school facilities immediately
after school by a Christian club designed for elementary school
children.374 The club claimed the free speech right to meet since
the school district allowed other non-school groups to meet
during the same time frame.375 The school district maintained
that allowing the religious club to meet would violate the
Establishment Clause, noting that elementary-aged children
would not be able to discern the difference between endorsing
the activity and merely accommodating it.376 The Court,
369

Id. at 307-08. Justice Stevens listed a number of contextual factors
supporting the conclusion of endorsement:
The actual or perceived endorsement of the message, moreover, is established
by factors beyond just the text of the policy. Once the student speaker is
selected and the message composed, the invocation is then delivered to a
large audience assembled as part of a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored
function conducted on school property. The message is broadcast over the
school’s public address system, which remains subject to the control of school
officials. It is fair to assume that the pregame ceremony is clothed in the
traditional indicia of school sporting events, which generally include not just
the team, but also cheerleaders and band members dressed in uniforms
sporting the school name and mascot. The school’s name is likely written in
large print across the field and on banners and flags.
Id.
370

Id. at 308 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (invalidating a
moment of silence statute because of an expressed preference for prayer)).
371
Id. at 309.
372
Id. at 313.
373
533 U.S. 98 (2001).
374
Id. at 103.
375
Id. at 102, 104.
376
Id. at 112-13.
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however, disagreed that the perceptions of the young children
attending the school determined the constitutionality of the
issue.377 Rather, since no student could attend a club meeting
without parental permission, the Court reasoned that whether
the religious club would be viewed as an endorsement of
religion needed to be considered from the parents’
perspective.378 In other words, whether such a club violated the
Establishment Clause turned on whether a reasonable parent
familiar with all the circumstances of after-school clubs at the
school would perceive an endorsement of religion or feel coerced
by the state to allow their child to attend.379 Applying this test,
the Court concluded that the Constitution posed no barrier to
allowing the club to meet.380
Interestingly, just as the Court has cited the unique
relationship between schools and children to declare special
rules with regard to students’ rights to freedom of expression,
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and due
process, the Court has referenced the same context to exercise
caution when interpreting the Establishment Clause. As the
court noted in Edwards v. Aguillard:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance
with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children,
but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom
will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may
conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family.
Students in such institutions are impressionable and their
attendance is involuntary.381

Thus, even with respect to the more restrictive Establishment
Clause, the Court has taken into account the context of
schools in determining whether the school has violated the
rights of children.
III.

APPLICATION OF GENERAL SCHOOL LAW PRINCIPLES TO
RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS

In the previous section, we examined various
constitutional challenges mounted by students against schools to
377
378
379
380
381

Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).
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determine when the Supreme Court has developed special rules
for the public school context. We found that in the context of free
speech, search and seizure, and due process, the Court has held
that public school students do not possess the same level of rights
as the general public.382 In each of these cases, the Court reached
this conclusion by balancing school district and student
concerns.383 The only exception we have found to this general rule
is the Establishment Clause cases. The Court has refused to
engage in a school-specific test because of the special language of
the Religion Clauses and the declarations of the Founding
Fathers.384 However, the Court has referenced schools’ unique
context when analyzing the Establishment Clause.385
In this section, we explain that the Parents Involved
decision should be analyzed in the same fashion as the majority
of student rights’ cases in which the Court has developed
special constitutional rules for the public school setting, and
that the Equal Protection Clause is different from the
Establishment Clause.
A.

Is the Equal Protection Clause Like the Establishment
Clause?

When examined against the backdrop of other school
law cases, it becomes clear that the Justices making up the
plurality in the Parents Involved case believe that Equal
Protection cases should be treated in the same manner as the
Establishment Clause cases. In other words, they reject the
application of a balancing test because the Equal Protection
Clause requires all racial classifications to be examined in the
same manner. For example, recall that Chief Justice Roberts
stated that the Constitution “prevents states from according
differential treatment to American children on the basis of
their color or race.”386 Also recall Justice Thomas’s assertion
that the Constitution is “color-blind.”387
However, an examination of the language of, and the
history behind, the Equal Protection Clause reveals that this
382

See supra Part II.
See generally supra Part II.A.
384
See supra Part II.B.
385
See supra Part II.B.
386
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 747 (2007) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
387
Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
383

2011]

PARENTS INVOLVED: THE CASE FOR SPECIAL RULES

547

constitutional provision contains no such prohibition. Andrew
Kull, in his volume, The Color-Blind Constitution, observes,
“The interesting fact that the Congress in 1866 considered and
rejected a series of proposals that would have made the
Constitution explicitly color-blind has been, in consequence,
largely forgotten.”388 Indeed, educational historian James
Anderson notes that the Republicans introduced seven versions
of the Fourteenth Amendment that contained a provision
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or color—all
were rejected.389 After all these proposals had been defeated,
Congress then accepted a version of the Equal Protection
Clause that replaced the color-blind provisions with an “equal
protection” provision “that protected undefined rights against
state infringement but avoided any principle that would forbid
discrimination on account of race or color.”390
According to James Anderson, “The change that was made
allowed states to discriminate by race as deemed appropriate,
especially in the arena of ‘social rights’ that included education.”391
Furthermore, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed
that “provisions forbidding distinctions of race and color had to be
dropped in order to gain enough support for the passage and
eventual ratification by the states.”392 “In other words,” Anderson
explained, “they left the constitutional question of racial
classifications by government unresolved.”393 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court should not pretend that they are limited by a
color-blind Equal Protection Clause.394
Even Justice Harlan’s invocation of the term “colorblind” in his famous dissent to Plessy does not provide
justification for reading the Constitution to prohibit all racial
classifications. Rather, his use of the term relates to the use of
“color” as a means to establish a ruling class who then enacts
laws “cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the
[Civil] [W]ar.”395 Nothing in Justice Harlan’s opinion examines
race-conscious actions taken to further the intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that is, to provide people of color with
388

ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 69 (1992).
James D. Anderson, Race-Conscious Educational Policies Versus a ColorBlind Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 36 EDUC. RESEARCHER 249, 254 (2007).
390
Id. at 254.
391
Id. at 255.
392
Id.
393
Id. at 256.
394
Id.
395
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560-61 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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equal opportunities enjoyed by white citizens. Justice Stevens
made the same point when chiding the majority opinion for
neglecting this seminal distinction and the fact that the policies
at issue in Brown only negatively affected one race.396
Further support for the proposition that Harlan’s use of
the term “color-blind” was not intended to eliminate all racial
classifications is found in another of Harlan’s opinions. Only
three years after Plessy, Harlan wrote the Court’s opinion in a
segregated school case, Cumming v. Richmond County Board of
Education.397 Cumming involved a challenge to a Georgia school
district’s decision to close the high school that served the
district’s African American children while maintaining the
school that served white children.398 In a unanimous opinion,
the Court upheld the board’s decision. Justice Harlan wrote:
The state court did not deem the action of the board of education in
suspending temporarily and for economic reasons the high school for
colored children a sufficient reason why the defendant should be
restrained by injunction from maintaining an existing high school for
white children. It rejected the suggestion that the board proceeded in
bad faith or had abused the discretion with which it was invested by
the statute under which it proceeded or had acted in hostility to the
colored race. Under the circumstances disclosed, we cannot say that
this action of the state court was, within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the state to the plaintiffs and to
those associated with them of the equal protection of the laws or of
any privileges belonging to them as citizens of the United States. We
may add that while all admit that the benefits and burdens of public
taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against
any class on account of their race, the education of the people in
schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the
respective states, and any interference on the part of Federal
authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified
except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights
secured by the supreme law of the land.399

Had Harlan’s use of the term “color-blind” Constitution had the
meaning ascribed to him by Justice Thomas, he would have
likewise dissented from the Cumming decision. To the contrary,
396

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 799 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens noted that Chief Justice Roberts’s attempts to revise history caused him to
recall “Anatole France’s observation: ‘[T]he majestic equality of the la[w], . . . forbid[s]
rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their
bread.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting LE LYS ROUGE (THE RED LILY) 95 (W.
Stephens trans., 6th ed. 1922)).
397
175 U.S. 528, 528 (1899). Interestingly, neither Justice Thomas nor any of
the other opinion authors in Parents Involved reference or discuss Cumming.
398
Id. at 530.
399
Id. at 545.

2011]

PARENTS INVOLVED: THE CASE FOR SPECIAL RULES

549

he concluded that a school district could offer no high school
education to a group of children solely based on the color of their
skin and do so without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.400
Moreover, even if one concludes as did the plurality in
Parents Involved that a “color-blind” interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause has evolved over time, and even if one
concludes that this view of the Fourteenth Amendment
parallels the Establishment Clause as a strict prohibition
against state action, it does not follow that every use of race to
serve nonremedial ends is per se unconstitutional. As our
review
of
cases
involving
school-sponsored
religion
demonstrates, the Court still engages in a careful examination
of context in order to determine whether state officials have
violated or run the risk of contravening the Establishment
Clause. The fact that religion arises in the public school context
is not sufficient to dictate the outcome. Dispositive contextual
factors include whether the officials’ purpose was legitimate
and secular;401 whether the activity was compulsory or
voluntary;402 whether it occurred during instructional or noninstructional time;403 whether state officials led the exercise or
used the “machinery of the state” to encourage or discourage

400

In the same case, Harlan also wrote:

The substantial relief asked is an injunction that would either impair the
efficiency of the high school provided for white children or compel the board
to close it. But if that were done, the result would only be to take from white
children educational privileges enjoyed by them, without giving to colored
children additional opportunities for the education furnished in high schools.
The colored school children of the county would not be advanced in the
matter of their education by a decree compelling the defendant board to cease
giving support to a high school for white children. The board had before it the
question whether it should maintain, under its control, a high school for
about 60 colored children or withhold the benefits of education in primary
schools from 300 children of the same race. It was impossible, the board
believed, to give educational facilities to the 300 colored children who were
unprovided for, if it maintained a separate school for the 60 children who
wished to have a high-school education. Its decision was in the interest of the
greater number of colored children, leaving the smaller number to obtain a
high-school education in existing private institutions at an expense not
beyond that incurred in the high school discontinued by the board.
Id. at 544.
401

See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
402
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594-95 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252
(1990); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
403
See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2000);
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251.
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religion;404 whether individuals are treated similarly regardless
of religious beliefs;405 and whether a reasonable observer
knowledgeable about the history and context would perceive a
state endorsement of religion.406 Accordingly, even the extra
“vigilance” afforded the application of the Establishment
Clause in public school settings does not result in an analysis
that is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”407 Just as nothing in
the
Establishment
Clause
precludes
a
contextual
interpretation of the amendment, nothing in the text or history
of the Equal Protection Clause provides the foundation for a
rigid interpretation of the provision excluding the observation
that “[c]ontext matters.”408
B.

Are Race-Conscious Policies Inherently Improper
Because They Imply “Racial Inferiority” and Create
“Racial Hostility”?

Another justification for the Court’s unyielding
application of strict scrutiny to race-conscious policies
regardless of context is the alleged propensity for such policies
to spawn notions of “racial inferiority” and consequent “racial
hostility.” Recall that Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern
that such propensity409 could “reinforce the belief . . . that
individuals should be judged by the color of their skin,”410 which
then could lead to “a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus
contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.”411
Consequently, Roberts concluded, any use of race in the
absence of a judicial remedial order threatened racial harmony.
The pathway to equal protection was clear to the Chief Justice,
who declared simply, “The way to stop discrimination on the

404

See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312; Lee, 505 U.S. at 59293; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226.
405
See, e.g., Good News, 533 U.S. at 114; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252.
406
See, e.g., Good News, 533 U.S. at 119; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252. For nonschool cases discussing this analysis, see, for example, McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky.,
545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682-83 (2005).
407
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(describing the problems associated with a rigid application of strict scrutiny in Equal
Protection Clause matters).
408
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003).
409
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
410
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
411
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”412
Also, Justice Kennedy in his concurrence warned that
“classifications . . . based on racial typologies can cause a new
divisiveness” and “lead to corrosive discourse” where race
serves “as a bargaining chip in the political process.”413
Unfortunately, this apprehension neglects two critical
aspects of the school programs under scrutiny. First, both
programs at issue were forms of school choice.414 The traditional
method of student assignment in the United States has long
linked the school a child attends to the location of the family
residence.415 The earliest school choice programs, so-called
magnet schools,416 evolved in direct relationship to the country’s
desegregation efforts.417 Districts, weary of forced busing
programs, adopted systems designed to induce parents to enroll
their children in schools they otherwise would be unlikely or
reluctant to attend, thereby achieving integration voluntarily.418
Accordingly, these early school choice programs were designed
to quell, not inflame, racial animosity. Moreover, to attract
parents who were neutral or opposed to integration, these
412

Id. at 748.
Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While Justice Thomas did not discuss
racial inferiority or hostility per se, he did include a lengthy discussion of the history of
racism in the United States. He concluded that discussion with the following: “Can we
really be sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a relic
of the past or that future theories will be nothing but beneficent and progressive? That
is a gamble I am unwilling to take, and it is one the Constitution does not allow.” Id. at
781-82 (Thomas, J., concurring). However, Thomas’s discussion neglects the simple fact
that the victims of the policies in both Dred Scott and Plessy were disenfranchised and
therefore had no means to affect the political process by which the policies were made.
In the first instance, the disenfranchisement was accomplished by the Constitution
itself and the second by Jim Crow laws designed to systematically suppress the
participation of African Americans in the democratic process. Thus, Thomas’s “gamble”
is unlikely to arise, and, even if it did, those affected could vote to challenge the policies
legislatively. Thomas’s view that judicial reasoning would limit litigation as a
corrective tool does not affect this conclusion.
414
Id. at 711, 716 (majority opinion).
415
See generally CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON
SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860 (1983); DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST
SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION (1974).
416
“[T]he term ‘magnet school’ means a public elementary school, public
secondary school, public elementary education center, or public secondary education
center that offers a special curriculum capable of attracting substantial numbers of
students of different racial backgrounds.” 20 U.S.C. § 7231a (2006); see also Magnet
School Assistance Act, id. § 7231.
417
JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET
METAPHOR 107 (1994). See generally MARY HAYWOOD METZ, DIFFERENT BY DESIGN: THE
CONTEXT AND CHARACTER OF THREE MAGNET SCHOOLS (1986).
418
HENIG, supra note 417, at 156; see also 20 U.S.C. § 7231(a)(1)-(2); Who We
Are, MAGNET SCH. AM., http://www.magnet.edu/modules/content/index.php?id=1 (last
visited Nov. 21, 2010).
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magnet schools developed unique curricular offerings as a
“carrot” to encourage parents and students to select those
schools.419 Parents could enroll their children in these choice
schools only by choosing to integrate. Enrollment patterns were
carefully monitored and only choices that furthered the
integrative intent of the program were permitted.420
Interestingly, the issue of magnet schools came up early
in oral arguments regarding the Seattle program. Notice Justice
Scalia’s recognition of the voluntariness associated with magnet
schools in his conversation with attorney Harry J.F. Korrell,
who represented the plaintiffs challenging the program:
JUSTICE SCALIA: You would object, then, to magnet schools? You
would object to any system that is designed to try to cause people
voluntarily to go into a system that is more racially mixed?
MR. KORRELL: Justice Scalia, our objection to the Seattle program
is that it is not a race neutral means.
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I understand. But I’m trying to find what,
you know, the outer limits of your contentions are. It doesn’t seem to
me that your briefs indicated that you would object to something like
magnet schools. The—even if one of the purposes of those schools is
to try to cause more white students to go to schools that are
predominantly non-white. It’s just voluntary, I mean, but the object
is to achieve a greater racial mix.421

Unfortunately, neither school district attorney articulated that
both the Seattle and Louisville programs shared with magnet
schools both the purpose and effect of voluntarily integration.422
Indeed, both intradistrict and interdistrict open enrollment
programs evolved over time as companion tools to magnet
schools in districts’ integration arsenals.423
The program operated in Louisville perhaps best
illustrates this evolution. The school board created a program
that allowed parents to list enrollment preferences for each
child.424 However, rather than eliminate neighborhood
assignment in its entirety, each child was assigned a “resides
419

HENIG, supra note 417, at 107-09.
Id.
421
Transcript of Oral Argument 6-7, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (Dec. 4, 2006) (No. 05-908), available at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-908.pdf.
422
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
423
Julie F. Mead, Including Students with Disabilities in Parental Choice Programs:
The Challenge of Meaningful Choice, 100 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 463, 463-64 (1995).
424
For the Seattle Program, see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711. For the
Jefferson County Program, see id. at 715-16.
420
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school” based on where the child lived.425 Accordingly, the
“resides” or residential assignment school became a sort of
default enrollment for each child and, indeed, more than half of
all students attended their “resides school.”426 Assignments to
other schools occurred only if the parent requested a transfer.427
Therefore, participation in Louisville’s transfer program, just
like participation in magnet programs, was voluntary on the
part of parents.
More importantly, both the Seattle and Louisville
programs existed specifically and explicitly to produce
integrated schools without forcing children to be bused to
schools outside their neighborhoods without parental
approval.428 And since urban neighborhoods, even in modern
times, tend to be racially identifiable,429 establishing a system
that induces parents to select schools for reasons other than
proximity to residence is inextricably intertwined with de facto
segregation in housing. Rather than attempting to alter these
residential patterns—a goal clearly outside the purview of
school policy-making authority—open enrollment programs
provide an incentive to parents to reach beyond their
neighborhoods for educational opportunities. Properly
understood then, it is clear such programs “seek to open minds
about and to offset the effects of those [housing] patterns—to
challenge and to be certain that those patterns are not
determinative of [educational] opportunity.”430
Second, the only way the majority’s conclusion about
racial hostility makes sense is if one accepts the proposition
that neither the City of Seattle nor the City of Louisville
experiences any racial hostility in the absence of the school
assignment policies, or if there is actual evidence that use of
the plan has enflamed existing hostility. Both propositions lack
any foundation. Allowing schools to become racially identifiable
would be more likely to engender racial hostility than a
program expressly designed to bring races together in
425

McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D.

Ky. 2004).
426
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Parents Involved 551 U.S. at 844 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 820.
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Population Studies Center, Racial Residential Segregation Measurement Project,
UNIV. OF MICH., http://enceladus.isr.umich.edu/race/seg.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
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Julie F. Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational
Ends in Elementary and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived from Recent
Judicial Decisions, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 98 (2002).
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preparation to live and work in a pluralistic society. Research
has consistently shown that intergroup conflict and stereotypic
thinking decreases when children are educated in integrated
settings.431 Furthermore, no evidence exists that the Seattle or
Louisville plans had any causal relationship to racial tensions
in either city.
And yet the Chief Justice’s discussion of racial hostility
completely ignored both the fact that racial animosity has never
been eradicated from our society and that educational programs
have played a central role in addressing that racial enmity, both
historically and contemporarily. Nor did his discussion of the
potential for racial hostility consider the very real possibility
that allowing parents unfettered choices will likely exacerbate
racial isolation.432 The Brown Court reviewed and accepted
evidence that the dual program struck down by its decision
caused children to infer that they lacked ability simply because
their skin was black.433 As Chief Justice Warren explained,
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their
educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas
case . . . [and] is amply supported by modern authority.434

431

For a review of that research, see Brief of American Educational Research
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6-9, Parents Involved, 551
U.S. 701 (Oct. 10, 2006) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915).
432
Policy Brief, Roslyn Arlin Mickelson et al., School Choice and Segregation
by Race, Class, and Achievement (Mar. 2008), available at http://epsl.asu.edu/epru/
documents/EPSL-0803-260-EPRU.pdf.
433
Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
434
Id. In a footnote to this passage, the Court cited extensive social science
research concluding that segregation led children to impute feelings of inferiority:
K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
Development (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth,
1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI;
Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A
Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are
the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal
Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld,
Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed.,
1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And
see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
Id. at 494 n.11.
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Unlike the segregation programs at issue in Brown, the policies
in Seattle and Louisville fell on students of all races.435
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts cited neither evidence nor any
research similar to that accepted by the Brown Court to show
that any students were caused to feel inferior because of the
programs at issue.436
Judicial consideration of “hostility” in relation to
bringing diverse groups of students together is not limited to
Equal Protection jurisprudence. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
other context in which the Court has addressed this concern is
in relation to religious divisions. For example, the dissenting
Justices in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris—which established the
constitutionality of publicly funded school voucher programs
that permitted religious school participation—raised concerns
that the political struggles to preserve or expand voucher
programs could engender political divisions along religious
lines.437 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dismissive response to these
concerns in relation to constitutional analysis is quite telling.
Justice Breyer would raise the invisible specters of “divisiveness”
and “religious strife” to find the program unconstitutional. It is
unclear exactly what sort of principle Justice Breyer has in mind,
considering that the program has ignited no “divisiveness” or “strife”
other than this litigation. Nor is it clear where Justice Breyer would
locate this presumed authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a
program that they have chosen but that we subjectively find
“divisive.” We quite rightly have rejected the claim that some
speculative potential for divisiveness bears on the constitutionality
of educational aid programs.438
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For the Seattle Program, see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 711-12
(2007). For the Jefferson County Program, see id. at 715-17.
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See generally id. at 701-48 (partially majority and partially plurality opinion).
437
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Breyer explained:
School voucher programs finance the religious education of the young. And, if
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money—to determine, for example, whether implementation has biased a
program toward or against particular sects, or whether recipient religious
schools are adequately fulfilling a program’s criteria? If so, just how is the
State to resolve the resulting controversies without provoking legitimate
fears of the kinds of religious favoritism that, in so religiously diverse a
Nation, threaten social dissension?
Id. at 723-24.
438
Id. at 662 n.7.
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Yet neither Roberts nor Kennedy adhered to the Court’s
previous wholesale rejection of speculative divisiveness when
they analyzed the constitutionality of Louisville’s and Seattle’s
race-conscious school assignment plan in Parents Involved.
In deciding another case, Chief Justice Rehnquist also
addressed the relationship between individual choices and
perceptions of state hostility. Locke v. Davey examined
limitations on a publicly funded scholarship program in the
higher education context.439 The state of Washington had
created the program with one limitation—that funds could not
be used for the study of theology for the purpose of entering the
ministry.440 Individuals pursuing other vocations could use
scholarship funds to support enrollment in various religious
classes. In reaching the conclusion that the limitation did not
offend the First Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, examined whether the state denial of the
individual’s choice evinced hostility toward religion.441 He
concluded that it did not.442 As he explained:
[W]e find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of the
Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise
Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward
religion. Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue,
we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for
vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally
suspect. Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey’s claim
must fail. The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of
devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding
places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars.443

Likewise, concerns about racial hostility stemming from school
districts’ use of race-conscious approaches lack merit when the
“historic and substantial state interest at issue” is juxtaposed
against the “relatively minor burden” of some students being
denied their first choice of school assignment.444 Arguably,
Davey’s burden was even greater than that of the petitioner in
Parents Involved. Davey had to forgo public funding if he
wished to follow his chosen vocation445—and yet his “burden” is

439
440
441
442
443
444
445

540 U.S. 712 (2004).
Id. at 715.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id. at 717.
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characterized as a “minor” encroachment on his rights.446 The
burden borne by the plaintiffs in Parents Involved only
implicated a child’s first choice of school, not all public
education. Even then, any denial often lasted for only one
school year.447
Therefore, concerns for “racial inferiority” and “racial
hostility,” while legitimately a consideration in Equal
Protection jurisprudence, should be recognized as only one of
myriad matters of fact to be analyzed in context after a full
examination of all evidence. Chief Justice Roberts’s unfounded
speculative concerns regarding racial hostility foreclosed the
possibility of using a balanced approach to examine the school
districts’ race-conscious school assignment plans in Parents
Involved.
C.

The Balancing Test Applied to Race-Conscious Student
Assignment Plans: Is There a Justification for a Special
Application of Strict Scrutiny?

We have explained above that the Equal Protection
Clause is different from the Establishment Clause in that its
text and history does not prohibit the Court from adopting a
balancing test that weighs the important functions and unique
concerns of school districts’ against its students’ constitutional
rights. Likewise, potential hostility engendered by the limited
use of racial classifications provides no justification for the
Court’s fatal application of strict scrutiny. In contrast, the
Court’s school law jurisprudence provides ample foundation for
the adoption of a version of strict scrutiny for Equal Protection
Clause that is fully cognizant of the special role public schools
play in our democratic republic. In other constitutional
contexts, the Court has balanced the concerns of school
districts against the concerns of students to determine whether
students receive different, or even lesser, constitutional
protection in schools than adults do in other settings.448 Even in
Establishment Clause cases arising in public school situations,
the Court has engaged in a contextualized application of the
various tests articulated to determine the boundaries of state
action with regard to religion.449 Thus, the uniquely important
446
447
448
449

Id. at 725.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 847-48 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
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purpose of schools, in addition to the special relationship
between school authorities and their students, weigh heavily in
favor of the Court adapting adjusted constitutional standards
as both a practical and equitable approach to analyzing school
district policies similar to those at issue in Parents Involved. In
this subsection, we examine race-conscious student assignment
plans to show that a contextualized application of strict
scrutiny would be more consistent with the Court’s collective
education law jurisprudence.
As noted above, strict scrutiny, as with any rights-based
constitutional test, begins with an examination of purpose.
Applying this analysis requires the reviewer to ascertain
whether the goal rises to the level of a compelling state
interest. Without reiterating the interests listed by Justice
Breyer in detail, it seems clear that the goals served by the
assignment plans were grounded in considerations at least as
strong, if not stronger, than those cited in support of lowered
constitutional standards in other rights-based contexts.
For example, one major concern of all public school
districts, including both Seattle and Louisville, is to improve
the academic achievement of African American students in
order to close identified achievement gaps.450 Federal law
supports the importance of addressing this issue. The No Child
Left Behind Act (NCLB)451 requires all students, including
minority students, to achieve proficiency on all state standards
for the school to attain adequate yearly progress (AYP).452
Schools that fail to achieve AYP could be subjected to a variety
of sanctions, ultimately including restructuring or conversion
to charter schools.453 Integration serves as a means to help
schools comply with NCLB. According to the National Academy
of Education, “there is a relatively common finding [in the

450

See, e.g., School Board: District Vision, Mission, and Core Beliefs, SEATTLE
PUB. SCH., http://www.seattleschools.org/area/board/mission.xml (last visited Nov. 10,
2010) (“All students will achieve to their potential and the achievement gap will be
eliminated as every student is challenged to learn at or above grade level.”); About
JCPS, 2010-11 District Goals and Strategies, JEFFERSON CNTY. PUB. SCH., http://www.
jefferson.k12.ky.us/About/Mission.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (“Strategic Goal 1”
envisions that the district “will enhance teaching by engaging teachers in reflective
practice that . . . will enable each student to attain high levels of performance and will
facilitate the closing of achievement gaps.”).
451
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006).
452
Id. § 6311.
453
Id. § 6316.
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social science research] that African American student
achievement is enhanced by integrated schooling.”454
Another major concern of school districts is to prepare
students for life in a culturally pluralistic society. Because of
the changing racial demographics in this country, schools can
assert that it is essential to help students learn how to coexist
with persons from other racial groups.455 According to the U.S.
Census, minorities will become the majority of the U.S.
population in 2042.456 In 2050, 30% of the country will be
Hispanic, 15% of the population will be African American, and
9.2% of the population will be Asian.457 The non-Hispanic white
population is expected to drop from 66% in 2008 to 46% in
2050.458 Research suggests that integrated schools help students
cope with this new reality. According to the National Academy
of Education, “The weight of the research evidence supports the
conclusion that there are long-term benefits of desegregation in
elementary and secondary schools. Under some circumstances
and over the long term, experience in desegregated schools
increases the likelihood of greater tolerance and better
intergroup relations among adults of different racial groups.”459
Note the parallels between these interests and that
which justified the imposition of suspicionless random
urinalysis programs in Vernonia and Earls. Both interests can
be traced to general societal concerns—drug and alcohol use by
students on the one hand, and enduring racial disparities in
educational attainment on the other. Although Justice Thomas
dismissed as “faddish”460 the robust research base that
substantiates the benefits of integrated schooling both for
students of color and for all students,461 neither he nor other
454

Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, An Older and More Diverse
Nation by Midcentury (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/population/012496.html.
455
Brief of Amici Curiae the Council of the Great City Schools et al. 2, Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915).
456
Id.
457
Id.
458
Id.
459
NAT’L ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING
STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES 2
(Robert L. Linn & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2007), available at http://www.naeducation.
org/Meredith_Report.pdf.
460
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 780 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
461
See, e.g., Brief of the American Educational Research Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents 5-6, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(Nos. 05-908, 05-915); Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents 4, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915).
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members of the Court required comparable evidence that
random urinalysis programs actually worked to lower student
drug use. In fact, available research has yet to confirm such a
link and some studies show either no diminution or even an
increase in reported drug use when schools with random drug
testing regimes are compared to similar schools without such
requirements.462 Neither did the Court require evidence that a
school had an actual drug problem in order to justify the
imposition of the test in absence of individualized suspicion of
Rather,
the
“custodial
and
tutelary”
wrongdoing.463
responsibilities of schools were sufficient to rationalize even the
encroachment on students’ privacy interests.464
Likewise, the school speech cases countenance relaxed
standards based on the special role schools play in training
children for later life. Recall that in Hazelwood, the Court
justified the adoption of less rigorous Free Speech Clause
protection for curriculum-related speech because of the schools’
role as “a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him adjust normally to his
environment.”465 Similarly, the Bethel Court referenced the
doctrine of in loco parentis466 and schools’ obligation to
“inculcate the habits and manners of civility”467 when
concluding that school officials could legitimately curtail lewd
and indecent speech. The Court in Goss v. Lopez, too, factored
the educational aspects of suspension as a teaching tool into its
articulation of constitutionally required due process procedures
462

See, e.g., Linn Goldberg et al., Outcomes of a Prospective Trial of StudentAthlete Drug Testing: The Student Athlete Testing Using Random Notification
(SATURN) Study, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 421, 426-27 (2007).
463
See supra notes 276-93 and accompanying text.
464
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995).
465
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (quoting Brown I, 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
466
Justice Thomas discussed in loco parentis at length in both his concurrence
in Morse and his dissent in Safford. In Morse, he argued that in loco parentis justifies a
variety of actions taken with respect to student speech and concludes that Tinker
should be overturned. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 417-18, 422 (2007) (Thomas,
J., concurring). Likewise in Safford, he cites in loco parentis as overriding a child’s
privacy interests even when subjected to a strip search by school officials. Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In contrast, his opinion in Parents Involved makes no mention of the
concept or its possible relationship to the adoption of these race-conscious intra-district
school choice programs. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 748-52 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
467
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (quoting BEARD &
BEARD, supra note 229, at 228).
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for students facing discipline and the deprivation of the
property interest of an education.468 Likewise, the Ingraham
Court referenced the educational utility of corporal punishment
to conclude that no notice or hearing was necessary prior to the
imposition of the traditional sanction.469 Most recently, the
Court in Morse permitted the disciplining of students whose
speech school officials “reasonably regard” as promoting drug
use, whether or not the student speaker intended such a
message.470 In each instance, the Court paid significant
attention to the special context of schooling and factored
considerations of the special relationship between schools and
students into its analysis of purpose.
Turning to the narrow tailoring component of strict
scrutiny, an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
commensurate with other constitutional issues in schools
would likewise consider a number of contextual factors
stemming from the educational environment. We frame the
question like the Court does when analyzing Establishment
Clause concerns. That is, would a reasonable observer,
knowledgeable about the history and context of the student
assignment plan under examination, conclude that the plan
primarily works to equalize opportunity or deny opportunity on
the basis of race? To answer this question we must consider a
number of factors, all of which have analogs in other
constitutional jurisprudence applied to schools.
First, what is the history of the district’s use of race to
determine students’ school assignments? Consideration of this
inquiry would uncover whether the community was ever
subject to a de jure school desegregation order. But it would
also uncover voluntary actions taken to avoid a judicial decree
of wrongdoing. So for example, rather than simply considering
the judicially formalized remedial or nonremedial motivations
as advised by the Parents Involved plurality, it would require a
more in-depth examination of the history behind the plan—
with “calm, dispassionate reflection upon what exactly has
been done, to whom and why.”471 As Justice Marshall observed,
“[t]he real irony” of relying on the remedial/nonremedial
distinction is that such judicial formalism can only be
468
469
470
471

dissenting).

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-81 (1977).
Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 286, 312 (1986) (Marshall, J.
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sustained by a “complete disregard for a longstanding goal of
civil rights reform, that of integrating schools without taking
every school system to court.”472 Many school districts entered
into voluntary integration plans for the express reason of
staying out of court and avoiding the imposition of a
“remedy.”473 As such, none of these districts acted pursuant to a
“remedial” order as the term is used by Justice Roberts in his
plurality decision. Yet, a thorough contextual analysis of a
race-conscious student assignment policy needs to examine its
entire history. So just as the history of the policy was
important in determining that school officials overstepped
constitutional religious boundaries in the Santa Fe case,474 the
evolution of the policy would be dispositive in the narrow
tailoring analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, a constitutionally consistent application of
narrow tailoring would examine how choice came to be granted
to children. If the Court had engaged in that analysis, it would
have been clear that the privilege to choose the school a child
would attend was intended as an inducement, a special benefit,
in order to further voluntary integration rather than by
“drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods.”475 In other words, the privilege
of selecting a school was conditioned on the parents
volunteering to permit the race of their child to be considered.476
Students have a legitimate expectation and right to a public
school education.477 However, they do not have a comparable
expectation to attend a particular school. Student assignments
are generally determined by the neighborhoods in which they
live. Race-conscious student assignment plans do not interfere
with a student’s right to attend public school. If a child decides
not to participate in the plan, then he can still enroll in his
assigned school.
472

Id. at 305.
Parents Involved, 501 U.S. 701, 805 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
474
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2000); see also
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (holding that displays of the
Ten Commandments in a county courthouse are unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985) (invalidating an
Alabama moment of silence statute for lack of a secular purpose).
475
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
476
See also Mead, supra note 430.
477
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1977) (holding that education is a property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). For a
discussion of the right to an education under state constitutions, see KERN ALEXANDER &
M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 1082-85 (7th ed. 2009).
473
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Accordingly,
just
as
the
right-versus-privilege
distinction played an important role in the constitutionality of
the urinalysis plans at issue in Vernonia478 and Earls,479 this
distinction should be a consideration in the analysis of student
assignment plans. A “conscientious objector” to random
urinalysis faces the sacrifice of ineligibility to participate in
extracurricular sports and clubs.480 Likewise, a conscientious
objector to any consideration of race in student assignment
would merely sacrifice the privilege of choice, not the right to a
public education. 481 Therefore, the plans do not unduly intrude
on the rights of conscientious objectors. While they may pay a
serious price for not participating in the race-conscious
assignment plan, those children are still able to receive a public
school education.
Third, a contextual application of strict scrutiny would
carefully examine any “burden” borne by a student whose
application for transfer was denied in relation to the purpose of
the program. In so doing, it may be helpful once again to
borrow a metaphor from Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In those situations, the Court considers whether the
“machinery of the state” has been employed to encourage or
discourage religion.482 Likewise in an Equal Protection analysis,
a court should examine whether the “machinery of the state” has
been employed to advantage or disadvantage the children of one
race. It would then become constitutionally dispositive whether
an assignment plan “impose[s] burdens on one race alone . . .
stigmatize[s] or exclude[s].”483 Moreover, a determination about
whether a racial stigma has been attached to any denial of a
choice would have to consider the parents’ role in the process of
selection. Recall that the Supreme Court, when considering
whether the school officials advanced religion by allowing a
religious club to meet after instructional hours at an
elementary school, pointed to parents as the “reasonable
478

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002).
480
Id. at 851 (Breyer, J., concurring).
481
This result is far less drastic than actions suggested by Justice Thomas. In
both Morse and Safford, he argues that those unhappy with either speech or search
policies “can seek redress in school boards or legislatures; they can send their children
to private schools or home school them; or they can simply move.” Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2656 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
482
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 347 U.S. 203 (1963).
483
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 799 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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observers” capable of discerning whether the school was
endorsing religion or merely accommodating the club’s
request.484 The Court reasoned that any coercion a child may
have felt or any child’s misperceived endorsement of religion
could be effectively cured by the knowledgeable parent.485
Analogously, the knowledgeable parent would provide the same
buffer for any child’s naïve interpretation of a choice program
with race conscious controls in place to ensure that every child
benefits from reasonably integrated school environments.
Moreover, drawing again on Fourth Amendment precedent,
just as students subjected to random urinalysis would be
expected to learn that such restrictions on individual liberties
were ultimately adopted “[f]or their own good and that of their
classmates,”486 so too would parents and teachers
knowledgeable about the history and context of the programs
be able to help children understand that the race-conscious
measures ultimately exist for their benefit and the benefit of
their classmates.
As a whole, then, consideration of all these school-based
factors would have lead to the conclusion that the school
assignment programs in Seattle and Louisville primarily
worked to equalize opportunity on the basis of race. In
addition, this contextualized review provides the mechanism by
which to address Justice Kennedy’s call for a “principled limit”
to the use of racial classifications.487 Moreover, since
consideration of the school-based factors depends on context,
and context varies from locality to locality, application of these
factors would create a functional barrier to Kennedy’s worry
that Congress might assert the authority to mandate
integration programs nationally.488
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis shows, it is clear that if the
Court had applied a contextualized review consistent with its
previous constitutional analyses in schools, then it would have
applied a standard of strict scrutiny to the race-conscious
student assignment plans in Parents Involved that likewise
484
485
486
487
488

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2000).
Id.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
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took into full account the special function of today’s public
elementary and secondary educational institutions. Such an
accounting would necessarily examine the compelling nature of
school officials’ goals to build and safeguard integrated
learning environments. The enduring racial differences in
achievement that motivated the racial analysis required by
NCLB have a direct etiology in, and unbroken evolution from,
our segregated history. As Barack Obama put it:
Segregated schools were, and are, inferior schools; we still haven’t fixed
them, fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, and the inferior
education they provided, then and now, helps explain the pervasive
achievement gap between today’s black and white students.489

Furthermore as recognized by five members of the Parents
Involved Court,490 integration positively impacts all students’
learning such that each child’s opportunities are advanced by a
program that seeks to guarantee the benefits of integrated
educational environments for all children, regardless of race.
A contextualized application of strict scrutiny places no
less emphasis on an examination of the race-conscious means,
even when taken in furtherance of a worthy goal. Therefore,
when examining whether the means are necessary and the use
of race is narrowly tailored to the articulated interest, a series
of contextual factors would need investigation. At a minimum,
consideration should be given to:
(a) whether facts exist to demonstrate the policy in question
engenders feelings of “racial inferiority” by a disadvantaged group
and whether facts link the policy to expressions of “racial hostility.”
(b) the history of the use of race in student assignment to schools
including,
(1) whether
segregation,

the

schools

were

ever

subject

to

de

jure

(2) whether judicial findings to that end have ever been made,
and
(3) whether officials took voluntary action in order to avoid a
judicial decree of wrongdoing.
(c) whether the use of race relates to a student assignment plan or a
student choice plan designed as an inducement to integrate; that is,

489

Barack Obama, Speech at the Constitution Center, Phila., Pa.: A More
Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008) (emphasis added).
490
Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg.
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does a denial implicate the privilege to choose a particular school or
does a denial interfere with the right to attend any school, and what
consequence must be accepted by conscientious objectors to the policy.
(d) whether the “machinery of the state” has been employed to
advantage or disadvantage the children of one race, including a full
explication of any burden borne by a child denied a preference in
relation to the purpose of the denial.

Given the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to broaden
opportunity, these contextual factors should ultimately
consider whether any race-conscious plan primarily works to
equalize or deny opportunity on the basis of race.
Our argument for a contextualized application of strict
scrutiny should not be confused with a call for unfettered
discretion on the part of school officials or unquestioning
deference on the part of judges. We believe that, just as the
Court’s speech, search, and due process tests have resulted in
litigation both upholding and striking down school authority,491
an application of strict scrutiny with full recognition of the
variety of contextual factors associated with schools would
likewise result in some plans being affirmed while others
would be invalidated.
In the end, we believe Chief Justice Warren’s framing of
the issue in Brown applies with equal force today in relation to
any analysis of race-conscious student selection plans:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws.492

Brown’s implicit assumption that eradicating de jure segregation
would be sufficient to equalize educational opportunities
491

See, e.g., Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that due
process rights of students were not violated by discipline for leaving school grounds to
participate in a protest); M.A.L. ex rel. M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 2008)
(upholding the constitutionality of a school district’s policy on leaflet distribution);
Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2008) (striking down school
officials’ discipline of students’ non-disruptive protest against student dress code);
Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008) (striking down
school’s video surveillance of locker room changing areas); Doran v. Contoocook Valley
Sch. Dist., 616 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D.N.H. 2009) (upholding dog sniff search of student
belongings); Alexander v. Underhill, 416 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Nev. 2006) (allowing due
process challenge to go forward in relation to discipline imposed after a school fight).
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Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
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underestimated both the resistance that would follow the Court’s
decree493 and the enduring effects of that “inherently unequal”494
system. We believe a contextualized application of strict scrutiny
that is vigilant but not rigid would be more consistent with the
Court’s treatment of other constitutional issues in schools. It
would recognize that each student enjoys a number of
constitutionally protected freedoms but that no right is absolute,
and that all rights must be critically examined in light of the
context in which they seek expression. Therefore, such an
application of strict scrutiny merely considers voluntary school
choice programs or any race conscious effort “in the light of [their]
full development and [their] present place”495 in today’s
educational systems and the important role schools play in
crafting opportunities for all children.

493

For a history of segregation and desegregation, see generally School
Segregation, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/deseg/deseg_gen.php?&page=1 (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
494
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
495
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